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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper is about the political economy of policy reform in contemporary Poland 
and Turkey.  It focuses on the period of 1980-97 in Turkey and 1989-97 in Poland during 
which the economies of these countries underwent significant structural changes and 
became integrated with global financial markets with the rise of the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange in 1991 and the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1986.   
 The first part of the paper provides an overview of the contending theoretical 
perspectives on "Phoenix risen" and on how external and domestic economic factors 
influence domestic political reforms in countries where integration with international 
financial markets has taken place.  In the second part of the paper, these propositions are 
then assessed against the Polish and Turkish experiences.  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 During the last decade, many developing countries have experienced a significant 
inflow of private capital as they became more integrated with international financial 
markets.1  The amount of private capital flowing into these countries, including bonds and 
loans ($54.8b), totaled $167.1 billion in 1995 while official development assistance was 
$64.2 billion.2  The figure for private finance represent a significant increase from earlier 
periods, including bonds and loans, as indicated by World Bank figures:  $51.4 billion 
during 1977-82, $34.9 billion in 1983-90, and $142.7 billion during 1991-94.3  With this 
increase in the flow of private capital into the emerging markets, scholars began to ask what 
factors contributed to this new phenomenon and what sort of relationship exists, if any, 
between the flow of private capital and domestic political reform (e.g., democratization) in 
the emerging market countries. 
 Emerging markets is a term that came out of the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC) of the World Bank Group.  The term refers to those developing and more developed 
countries where one finds new stock markets.  This definition is widely accepted by scholars 
and practitioners.  However, there are different definitions of global finance.  For the 
purposes of this study, we adopt a definition of global finance provided by Benjamin Cohen: 
. . . global finance is assumed to encompass all types of cross-border 
portfolio-type transaction–borrowing and lending, trading of currencies or 
other financial claims, and the provision of commercial banking or other 
                                                 
1World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (Washington, DC:  World Bank, 
1995), p. 12. 
2International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 1996 (Washington, DC:  IFC, 
1996), p. 6. 
3World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, p. 12. 
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financial services.  It also includes capital flows associated with foreign direct 
investment–transactions involving significant control of producing 
enterprises.  Financial globalization (or internationalization) refers to the 
broad integration of national markets associated with both innovation and 
deregulation in the postwar era and is manifested by increasing movements 
of capital across national frontiers.  The more alternative assets are closely 
regarded as substitutes for one another, the higher the degree of capital 
mobility.4 
 This definition of global finance presents a comprehensive view of the subject that 
lends itself for operationalization and testing.  As capital mobility increases, international 
financial markets are expected to become more integrated.  Accordingly, governments will 
presumably undertake various policy reforms to improve their respective economies' 
attractiveness to foreign capital.  Similarly, the relationship between global finance and 
domestic political reform in the emerging markets is a contested topic among scholars.  In 
the next section, different views on these relationships will be examined. 
 Poland and Turkey provide an excellent test cases for the above relationships.  
During the last two decades, different Polish and Turkish governments pushed ahead with 
the restructuring and further integration of the economy with global capitalism.  These 
efforts followed the adoption of Poland and Turkey's most comprehensive austerity 
programs, sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in January 1990 and 
January 1980 respectively.  The result has been a thorough political and socioeconomic 
transformation of both countries that display a complex interplay of domestic and foreign 
forces. 
 
II.  RISE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS:  MYTH OR REALITY? 
 During the last decade there has been a growing body of literature that examines the 
expansion of global financial markets.5  As Cohen asks "how can we explain the remarkable 
globalization of financial markets of recent years, and what are its economic and political 
                                                 
4Benjamin J. Cohen, "Phoenix Risen:  The Resurrection of Global Finance," World Politics, 48, 2 
(January, 1996): 269. 
5For example of such works see Benjamin J. Cohen, "Phoenix Risen," pp.  268-96; Stephen R. Gill and 
David Law, "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital," International Studies Quarterly, 33, 
(December, 1989); John B. Goodman,  Monetary Sovereignty:  The Politics of Central Banking in Western 
Europe (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1992); John B. Goodman and Louis W. Pauley, "The 
Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets," World Politics, 
46, (October, 1993); Eric Helleiner, States and the Remergence of Global Finance:  From Bretton Woods 
to the 1990s (Ithace, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1994); Eric Helleiner, "The World of Money:  The 
Political Economy of International Capital Mobility,"  Policy Sciences, 27, 4 (1994); Peter Isard, 
Exchange Rate Economics (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995); Ethan B. Kapstein, 
Governing the Global Economy:  International Finance and the State (Cambridge:  Harvard University 
Press, 1994); Peter Kurzner, Business and Banking:  Political Chance and Economic Integration in 
Western Europe (Ithace, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1993); and Andrew C. Sobel, Domestic Choices, 
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implications?"6  These questions go to the heart of the relationship which is now at the 
forefront of research in international political economy.  However, we ought to be careful not 
to assume that this is a new phenomenon.  It simply is not.  What we observe is a more 
complex version of what has been a practice for a long time.  
 Markets for exchanging different monetary instruments are very old.  Arrangements 
for exchanging gold and silver coins of different societies go back to ancient times.  
Moreover, the Sumerians were the first people to write a book on international business in 
2,000 BC.  It is ironic that we are discovering international business now!  According to 
Charles Kindleberger "international banking developed simultaneously with local banking 
after the introduction of the bill of exchange by the Italians in the thirteenth century."7  
This was followed by a widespread use of paper instruments as means of payment in the 
fourteenth century and the rest is history. 
 In recent decades, as Peter Isard notes, "the institutional characteristics of markets 
for exchanging different monetary instruments have been influenced by another profound 
transformation in the means of settling transactions."8  With the onset of 
telecommunications and computer technology revolutions, the practice of using paper 
instruments to settle international transactions has for the most part become obsolete.  
Now, international payments can be made through rapid transmission via 
telecommunication instruments.  The works cited above (fn. 5) address the causes of these 
changes. 
 According to Benjamin Cohen, scholarly works identify three sets of factors 
responsible for the rise of financial markets:  systemic or structural, state or domestic, and 
cognitive or ideological–similar to the notion of Waltz's three images.9  In this regard, Eric 
Helleiner notes two sets of causal interpretations:  the impact of technological changes and 
market forces that work at the expense of states' roles and the autonomy of the states.10  
For Helleiner, the answer lies in the autonomy of the states as governments enter into a 
competition of deregulation in order to attract foreign capital. 
 Philip Cerny, on the other hand, argues for a combined effects of three sets of 
explanations–the market forces, institutional and technological advances, and political 
processes.11  The last component of Cerny's classification is further refined to reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                        
International Markets:  Dismantling National Barriers and Liberalizing Securities Markets (Ann Arbor:  
University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
6Cohen, "Phoenix Risen," p. 268. 
7Charles Kindleberger, A Financial History of Western Europe.  (London:  George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 
p. 39. 
8Peter Isard, Exchange Rate Economics.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 13. 
9Cohen, "Pheonix Risen," p. 274.  For the three images argument see, Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, 
and War, (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1959). 
10Helleiner.  States and the Remergence, p. 1. 
11Cerny, "The Deregulations aand Re-regulation," as cited in Cohen, "Pheonix Risen," p. 274. 
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dynamics of domestic interest groups politics and the relative autonomy of the state.  One 
other work which deserves special notice is Andrew Sobel's book on the international 
securities markets.  According to Sobel, three sets of explanations can be made for 
explaining the rise of international financial markets.  The first two explanations, systemic 
changes and foreign policy consideration, fall into the category he calls the "outside-in" 
group.  The third explanation, domestic pressures, represent the "inside-out" factors.12  
The former includes competition among national markets, changes in technologies, and 
power politics, meaning the exercise of power as foreign policy tool, between states.  The 
result is that national governments respond to these external pressures and reform their 
policies to enhance flow of financial capital.  In contrast, the inside-out explanation focuses 
on the stimuli for change coming from increased competition between organized interest 
groups within domestic political economies.13  Sobel maintains that it is the domestic, or 
the inside-out, considerations that have had a spillover effect in the international financial 
markets.14  He further argues that the inside-out explanations require important 
components:  (1) that contradictions must exist in that forces can be mobilized for political 
action, and (2) that "contextual shifts restructured the policy area sufficiently to overcome 
the status quo and past obstacles to regulatory change."15 
 Based on these alternative explanations, Cohen proposes four models (which he 
refers to as hypotheses) for investigation:  (1)  the impact of competition and innovation in 
the financial market place based on the neoclassical economists' arguments, (2)  the role of 
policy rivalry among governments in an insecure world based on the realist view, (3) the role 
of domestic politics and institutions in driving international development based on the 
pluralist paradigm, and (4) the role of belief systems and epistemic communities as 
catalysts for change based on the cognitive model.16  These alternative approaches 
provided the basic framework for a systematic analysis of the problem.  However, Cohen's 
models exclude the alternative formulations put forth by radical economic thought like the 
dependencia, neo-Marxist,  and the world system analysis literature.  According to these 
views, one can hypothesize that the rise in financial markets is due to one social class’ 
desire to increase its profit base by making the world market its domain.  Moreover, we can 
further refine the research question by distinguishing between the interests of the foreign 
                                                 
12Sobel, Domestic Choices, pp. 13-16.  It should be noted that the terms "outside-in" and "inside-out" 
come form Kenneth Waltz's earlier study, The Theory of World Politics, (Reading:  Addison-Wesley, 
1979).  Cohen in his review of Sobel's work makes this observations. 
13Ibid., p. 16. 
14Other scholars support this observation.  For some examples see, Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism 
(Boston:  MIT Press, 1989), I. M. Destler and John Odell, Anti-Protection:  Changing Forces in United 
States Trade Politics (Washington, DC:  Institute for International Economics, 1987), and Helen Milner, 
Resisting Protectionism (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1988). 
15Sobel, Domestic Choices, pp. 88-89. 
16Cohen, "Phoenix Risen," p. 274-75. 
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industrialists and financiers as these respective groups of investors look for opportunities 
for investment.17 
 Other works take this topic of financial market's rise to prominence and apply it to 
the recent political reforms in the emerging markets.  The aim is to examine whether or not 
there exist some causal relationship between the rise of emerging markets, more specifically 
their integration with global financial markets, and domestic reforms in the form of 
democratization.  Until recently, studies of the political economy of foreign investment in the 
Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and/or the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) 
indicated that the decade of 1970s can be seen as one of rapid debt accumulation, the 
1980s of economic reorientation under the IMF and World Bank supervision, and the 1990s 
as the decade of growth and integration with global financial markets.  In this last stage, we 
observe varying degrees of domestic reforms (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey) and 
challenges to authoritarian state by organized interest (e.g., China and Russia).  Though 
there is no empirical proof that integration with global financial markets results in  
democratization in these countries, the probability of the relationship carries important 
theoretical and policy implications.  If the relationship exists, this would negate the earlier 
findings that demonstrated a causal relationship between economic austerity, flow of foreign 
investment, and the rise of authoritarian regimes.18 
 This plausible relationship between financial markets and democratization goes to 
the heart of the basic assumptions one finds in the traditional literature on markets and 
politics.19  Furthermore, the relationship, if exists, refutes the long standing assumption in 
North American political science and economics that economics and politics are separate 
and to a large extent unconnected.  As Milton Friedman explains, this view basically holds 
                                                 
17For examples of radical economic thought see T. DosSantos, "The Structure of Dependence"  American  
Economic Review  60 (May, 1970): 231-236; Joan Robinson,  Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment. (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1979); Samir Amin.  Unequal Development. (New York:  Monthly Press, 1980); Fernando H. 
Cardoso  "Dependency and Development in Latin America." New Left Review, 74 (July-August, 1972): 83-95; Ronald 
Chilcote (1985).  Theories of Development and Underdevelopment.  (Boulder:  Westview, 1985). 
18For some examples see Henri J. Barkey, The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East (New 
York:  St. Martin's Press, 1992), David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America 
(Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1979), Dharam Ghai, The IMF and the South:  The Social Impact 
of Crisis and Adjustment (London:  Zed Books, 1991), Joan Nelson, ed., Economic Crisis and Policy 
Choice:  The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1990), 
Robert Kaufman, "Democratic and Authoritarian Responses to the Debt Issue:  Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico," International Organization, 39 (1985), pp. 473-503, Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and 
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1979), and Birol A. Yesilada 
and Mahir Fisunoglu, "Assessing the January 24, 1980 Economic Stabilization Program In Turkey,"  
In Henri J. Barkey, ed., The Politics of Economic, pp. 183-212. 
19See for example Anthony Downs, An Economic Thoery of Democracy (New York:  Harper and Row, 
1957), Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1960), 
Robertr Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
1987), Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1947) and Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Mass:  Harvard University 
Press, 1970), and Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets:  The World's Political-Economic Systems (New 
York:  Basic Books, 1977) and Lindblom, "Market and Democracy–Obliquely," PS:  Political Science & 
Politics, 27, 4 (1995), pp, 684-688. 
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that "individual freedom is a political problem and material welfare an economic problem; 
that any kind of political arrangement can be combined with any kind of economic 
arrangement. ... Such a view is a delusion, that there is an intimate connection between 
economics and politics, ... only certain combinations of political and economic 
arrangements are possible, and that in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be 
democratic, in the sense of guaranteeing individual freedom."20  According to Friedman, 
economic freedom is an end in itself and also a prerequisite for political freedom. 
 This possible relationship between markets and democratization was recently the 
topic of a conference at Brown University in November 1995, where scholars and financial 
officials discussed the ramifications of these issues. Participants presented various ideas 
pertaining to this topic and attempted to build in the works of current researchers in this 
field.21 However, there is a fundamental weakness in the way most researchers are tackling 
this topic.  The most common approach is to look at the relationship between markets and 
politics in a linear fashion by identifying a dependent and various independent variables.  It 
is highly likely that such approaches miss the crucial complexity of the existing 
relationships between markets and politics and also with the social dimension of 
economic/political development.  This methodological issue is related to the powerful 
dialectic relationship John Goodman and Louis Pauley raise in their study of global markets 
and capital controls.  They argue that there exists a powerful dialectic relationship between 
market forces and public policy where government actions result in increased capital 
mobility which, in turn, increases pressures for further liberalization of the policies.22 
 The conclusion of the works on emerging markets fall into two classes–those which 
find some degree of causality between increased integration of the financial markets and 
democratization and those which maintain that the opposite relationship is crisis.  In this 
regard, the study by Leslie Armijo is highly relevant.  Armijo provides two sets of hypotheses 
for direct and indirect links between foreign capital inflows and democracy and evaluates 
them in Brazil, India, and Mexico.  Although the analysis is far short of a rigorous empirical 
testing, Armijo's study is rich in data and provides the following observations: 
[results provide] a partial return to two of the crucial insights of dependency 
theory.  First, dependence on foreign capital for industrial investment tends 
                                                 
20Friedman, Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
21Leslie Elliot Armijo, "Mixed Blessings:  Foreing Capital Inflows and Democracy in 'Emerging 
Markets'" Paper presented at the Workshop on Financial Globalization and Emerging markets:  Policy 
Autonomy, Democratization and Lessons from Mexico.  Watson Institute of International Studies, 
Brown University, November 18-19, other papers include Thomas Biersteker and Christine Kearnet, 
"International Sources of Contemporary Democratization," Michael Gavin, Ricardo Hausmann and 
Leonardo Liederman, "The Macroeconomics of capital Flows to Latin America," and Sylvia Maxfield and 
Joshua Hoffman, "International Portfolio flows to Developing/Transitional Economies:  Impact on 
Government Policy Choice." 
22John B. Goodman and Luis W. Pauley, “The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic 
Management in an Age of Global Markets,” World Politics, 46 (October, 1993). 
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to bring with it increased direct or indirect influence for foreign governments 
and/or business into the process of national economic policy choice, in most 
diversions of democratic theory normatively understood as the exclusive 
province of resident citizens.  Second, reliance on most of not all forms of 
foreign capital brings with it an anti-egalitarian bias, in that those private 
actors involved (and direct beneficiaries of) international financial 
intermediation, whether as borrowers or lenders, tend to be big rather than 
small businesses, and already wealthy rather than low-income individuals.23 
 Armijo further concludes that while the causality in this relationship is rather 
murky, at the very least, economic growth makes "the consolidation of democracy, once 
established, easier than it otherwise would be."24 
 In her review of these conclusions, Mary Ann Haley argues that there is a very 
important factor overlooked by Armijo.  According to Haley, Armijo fails to consider the 
fundamental role played by institutional investors (money managers of pension funds, 
insurance companies, banks, brokerage firms, and large multinational corporations) in 
influencing policy decisions.25  This is an important observation and to establish the 
relationship the researcher needs to carry out a micro-level search to see the relationship 
between the representatives of the investors and the governmental decision-makers. 
 Based on the above review, we will consider the following questions of theoretical 
and policy significance to analyze the relationship between financial markets' integration 
and domestic reform in Poland and Turkey: 
Q1.  What is the nature of the relationship between market reforms and 
democratization in Poland and Turkey? 
Q.2.  Is there a causal relationship between Poland and Turkey's integration with the 
global financial markets and democratization?26 
Q3.  What are the foreign factors involved in these relationships? 
Q4.  What was the nature of the stabilization and adjustment policies (neoorthodox, 
heterodox, or a combination) in Poland and Turkey? 
                                                 
23Armijo, "Mixed Blessings," p. 36. 
24Ibid., p. 37. 
25Mary Ann Haley, "Freedom and Finance:  Institutional Investors and Democracy in Emerging 
Markets," paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association in 
San Francisco, March 12-16, pp. 9-10. 
26 This question is aimed at determining the nature of democratic reforms in Poland and Turkey.  It is 
interesting that when these countries and other emerging market economies first attempted export 
oriented growth during the 1970s and early 1980s, they often experienced authoritarian political rule.  
However, as these countries’ economies began to integrate with global financial markets, we observe 
domestic political reform in the direction of democratization. Why is this happening?  What are the 
domestic and foreign factors affecting democratic reform?  Is it the international financiers’ interests in 
having highly liberalized markets that is spilling over into the political domain in the form of 
democratic reforms?  Is there are difference in the interests of foreign financiers and the industrialists 
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III.  TYPES OF CAPITAL FLOWS INTO THE EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 
 As we explained above, systemic and technological changes in the world resulted in 
increased financial flows between the mature and emerging market economies.  Table 1 
provides figures on the type of such flows.  The data clearly show the growing importance of 
the emerging markets for global investments.  Among the investment types, private capital, 
specially in the form of portfolio investments, is becoming a key factor in this picture.  As 
portfolio investments increased, stock markets of these countries became important sites 
for profit making/losses for the global investors.  At the same time, the impact of these flows 
on the macroeconomic indicators of the receiving countries has been significant.  Private 
capital flows provide important source of capital in balancing the current account of the 
countries - that is, if there is a net flow.  Furthermore, the recipient country’s inflation rate 
and foreign exchange reserves can benefit from these investments.  However, none of these 
benefits can be achieved unless the government adopts realistic monetary policy and carries 
out the needed structural reforms in the economy.  This is the crucial juncture for public 
policy and market performance.   
 In addition to their macroeconomic impact, such flows provide incentives for 
governments to carry out structural and financial reforms and to adopt stable monetary 
policy.  In this sense, such financial flows represent the outside-in pressures for reform in 
the emerging markets.  Failure to carry out the necessary reforms carries with it the danger 
of market speculation, foreign exchange crisis, and dangerous volatility of the stock markets 
(e.g., the foreign exchange crisis of Mexico and Turkey in 1994 and the subsequent market 
falls).  The results of such events could be catastrophic as we witnessed in Mexico in the 
form of massive flight of capital.  In sum, inflow of foreign capital can provide benefits as 
well as risks for the emerging market countries. 
 In addition to their effect on macroeconomic stability/instability, financial 
liberalization also reduces the ability of the public officials to carry out public policy in this 
sector.  Monetary substitutes create a tremendous problem for public officials.  As soon as a 
country begins to experience macroeconomic imbalances, individuals can shift their 
demand for money from the local currency to hard currencies.  When this occurs, it 
becomes difficult for governments to reestablish macroeconomic balance and, as a result, 
inflation begins to get out of control and foreign exchange rates start to climb.  This 
highlights the important effect of financial liberalization on monetary policy in a country.   
 As monetary policy and foreign exchange markets become highly interdependent, the 
central bank’s role in determining the country’s monetary policy becomes more and more 
significant.  The recent trend in this area is that the central banks are becoming more 
                                                                                                                                                        
(who earlier invested in these economies for import substitution and later export-oriented growth, and 
allied themselves with domestic authoritarian forces)? 
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independent.  The structural reforms demanded by foreign institutions like the IMF and the 
World Bank also reflect this pressure.  Under such conditions, governments find it more 
and more difficult to go to the central bank and manipulate the money supply to satisfy 
their economic policy targets.  These crucial developments in demand for money, monetary 
substitutes, and foreign exchange policies coupled with pressures to reform the relevant 
economic structures represent the inside-out pressures for reform.  Under financial 
liberalization individuals can resort to monetary substitutes with relative ease (inside-out 
pressure).  Subsequently, failure of public officials to establish macroeconomic balance can 
have dramatic effects on the economy.  A sensible response would be to provide for central 
bank autonomy and allow professional technocrats the capacity to determine monetary 
policy of the country in accordance with market conditions.  Yet, in many emerging 
markets, governments find it difficulty to surrender this politically crucial instrument to 
non-elected technocrats. 
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Table 1:  Aggregate Net Long-Term Resource Flows to Emerging Markets ($US b.) 
 
Type of Finance 1985-89 1990-92 1993 1994 1995 
Official Developmental 
Finance 
 
209.1 
 
178.4 
 
53.0 
 
48.6 
 
64.2 
Private Debt Flows 67.9 73.9 40.3 43.8 54.8 
commercial bank 22.8 18.0 -4.9 9.2 17.1 
others 23.4 26.9 6.9 2.4 4.0 
portfolio, bonds and debt 15.6 29.0 38.3 32.2 33.7 
Portfolio, Equity 6.0 25.4 45.6 34.9 22.0 
Direct Foreign Investment 82.9 106.6 68.3 80.1 90.3 
Total Private 157.2 205.9 154.2 158.8 167.1 
Aggregate Net Resource 
Flows 
 
366.2 
 
384.3 
 
207.2 
 
207.4 
 
231.3 
of which official (%) 57.6 47.9 25.6 23.4 27.8 
of which portfolio, equity 1.5 6.1 22.0 16.8 9.5 
      
Source:  IFC.  Emerging Stock Markets Factbook, 1996.  p. 6. 
 
 
 
IV.  THE POLISH AND TURKISH CASES 
Polish Experiment With Reform 
 Due to prolonged economic crisis of the late 1980s and widespread direct 
appeal to the public of the Solidarity movement, the parliamentary elections in June 
1989 resulted in Solidarity winning all available 161 seats in the lower house, and 
99 out of 100 in the Senate. In August the first non-communist Solidarity-led 
government of prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki took office. Its comprehensive 
economic program was developed by an economic team formed by the deputy-prime 
minister and finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Although Mazowiecki, after losing 
his bid for presidency to Walesa in November 1990, was replaced by Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki in January 1991 (a second Solidarity-led government), the economic team 
remained intact with Balcerowicz remaining on both of his government positions.  
 In October of 1991, the first completely free parliamentary elections were 
held. Although the anti-Solidarity opposition remained relatively weak, the 
honeymoon season for the government was quickly evaporating. The public was 
increasingly becoming impatient with the harsh reforms and with fragmentation of 
the post-Solidarity parties. The elections resulted in a new center-right government 
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of prime minister Jan Olszewski. Since Balcerowicz left the government, and new 
president Walesa was gradually losing his charismatic appeal, there were hardly any 
leaders with a vision of reforms and alternative economic program at the top of 
Polish politics. Quickly the political issues took precedence over economic 
considerations. Politicking in parliament resulted with the Solidarity leaders losing 
public approval.  
 As we see in Table 3, about mid-1992 the honeymoon period for the 
Solidarity-led governments was over. At that time prime minister Olszewski was 
succeeded by Waldemar Pawlak, who for a month was not able to form government 
and was subsequently replaced by Hanna Suchocka from Democratic Union (DU)27. 
Despite the introduction of constitutional amendments enabling governments to 
bypass legislative procedures and decide on economic issues by decree, the 
fragmentation of the legislature was perceived as such an obstacle for efficient 
governing that president Walesa dissolved the parliament in mid-1993. Soon 
thereafter, in August, the Suchocka's government resigned after a vote of no 
confidence. The widespread direct appeal of Solidarity to the public came to an end. 
 New elections were held in September (with 5 % threshold substantially 
reducing the number of parties in the parliament), resulting in former communists, 
the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) receiving the most votes (more than 20 %) and 
173 seats in the parliament, and the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) ranking second 
with 130 seats (and more than 15 % of the vote). The urban-based SLD was pro-
market reform oriented, whereas the rural PSL favored substantial domestic 
protectionism (especially in terms of financial supports for farmers, wide 
preservation of nationalized industry, and tariff shields against subsidized 
agricultural imports from the EU). A new government of  prime minister Waldemar 
Pawlak (PSL) was formed in October 1993, and lasted until March 1995, when he 
was replaced by Jozef Oleksy (SLD) who became the seventh prime minister since 
August of 1989. In the period of 1993-1995, president Walesa remained the main 
opposition figure to the ex-communist government and proceeded to undermine it 
whenever possible at the cost of substantially losing personal popularity. 
Subsequently, in November 1995, he lost his bid for reelection to Aleksander 
Kwasniewski (SLD). Following increasing accusations of spying for the KGB at the 
end of 1995, prime minister Oleksy resigned and was replaced by Wlodzimierz 
Cimoszewicz (SLD) on 1 February 1996. 
 The last communist government before 1989, was reluctant to take tough 
stabilization measures to restore Poland's macroeconomic stability. It left the legacy 
                                                 
    
27
 DU transformed later into Freedom Union. 
 13 
of excessive wage increases, irresponsible monetary policy (with inflation increasing 
at a monthly rate of 10% at early 1989), and budget deficit (reaching 10 %  of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for the first nine months of 1989)28. One of the main policy 
goals of all of the governments in the 1990s was to establish the foundations for 
sustainable economic growth, as expressed by the first Polish Letter of Intent to the 
IMF: “the sustained growth of output and living standards and the strengthening of 
our external position over the medium term...are  the ultimate goals of our 
efforts”29. 
 The first step towards that end was the implementation of radical economic 
reforms in January, 1990 - the so-called Balcerowicz plan30 or more commonly 
known as the Shock Therapy31. This stabilization and adjustment program was a 
mixture of restrictive financial policies that included a drastic devaluation of the 
zloty.  The overall goal was to stop hyperinflation and liberalize the economy. 
Although such policies contributed to relatively high unemployment32 and to an 
overall economic recession, the first governments were committed to promoting a 
more equal distribution of income along with improving overall economic conditions 
and furthering structural reform. The program resulted in a spectacular capping of 
hyperinflation and balancing of both foreign trade and the government budget.  As 
Jacek Osinski and Andrzej Slawinski point out it, also, produced “A favorable 
currency substitution. Demand for money shifted back toward domestic currency in 
the previously ‘dollarized’  economy”33.   
 
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
 
                                                 
28 James Bjork "The Uses of Conditionality: Poland and the IMF", East European Quarterly, XXIX, No.1 March 1995, 
pp.95-96. 
29 LOI, December 22, 1989, p.1. 
30 The Balcerowicz plan was announced in September 1989 to both the IMF and the World Bank and revealed the finance 
minister's desire to go even further than IMF required. The plan's priorities were:  
- rapid price liberalization,  
- sharp devaluation and complete convertibility of Polish currency, 
- stabilization of the exchange rate,  
- elimination of government subsidies,  
- substantial increase of interest rates,  
- taxation of excessive wage increases,  
- removal of barriers to private entrepreneurship, 
- privatization of most state owned enterprises (SOEs),  
- IMF and World Bank lending to Poland,  
- establishment of a stabilization fund for the Polish currency, and  
- substantial debt relief. (Bjork "The Uses..., p.98) 
31 As used interchangeably with the Balcerowicz plan, Shock therapy describes a series of radical market-oriented reforms to 
overcome the severe economic problems inherited from the command economy. It consisted of the IMF- supported program 
which focused on trade and exchange rates liberalization, privatization, and monetary/fiscal reform. 
32 Unemployment reached its highest in 1994 - about 17% of the total workforce (Poland:  March 1996, Barclays Bank 
Country Report, 1996 Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, March 1, 1996.) 
33 Jacek Osinski and Andrzej Slawinski, National Bank Of Poland And Open Market Operations, Warsaw, 1994, p.4. 
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 The information in Table 2 shows that the implementation of market-oriented 
reforms was successful in a vast majority of policy issues. A "yes/no" indicates, in 
majority of the cases, that the governments were just not eager to speed up progress 
in a given issue area, but by no means did they stop or reverse the advancements 
that had already been done. Sometimes, even during such slowdown periods, major 
pieces of pro-market legislation passed the legislature (for example the mass 
privatization laws during the Pawlak government), but were not readily implemented 
by the government.  
 As documented in  Table 2, the very first Solidarity-led governments 
abolished the bulk of the quantitative trade restrictions and of export subsidies. 
Subsequent governments somehow revised that policy, by imposing some 
protectionist barriers in several sectors (for example automobiles). Along with 
removing trade restrictions, the limitations on the availability of foreign exchange for 
current account transactions have been largely eliminated34. The Mazowiecki 
government introduced in 1989 an enterprise income tax, with a uniform rate of 40 
%. Next year it instituted an unemployment insurance scheme (Labor Fund), 
financed by a 2 % payroll tax (increased to 3 % in 1993). In 1992, a personal income 
tax was launched with a top marginal rate of 40 % (raised to 45 % in 1994). These 
developments were followed by a value added tax (VAT), which came into existence 
in 1993, with a standard rate of 22 % and a reduced rate of 7 %. The payroll tax to 
finance the Social Insurance Fund was at 38 %, but was raised to 45 per cent in 
199235. The first governments applied for the state enterprises, a tax to the excess 
of average wages over a predetermined norm (the so-called "Popiwek"). Although it 
ceased to exist in April 1994, it was re-introduced on 1 August 1994, during the 
term of Pawlak government.  
 An essential part of the economic stabilization policy was the containment of 
the fiscal deficit. In both 1991 and 1992 the deficits were about 6 % of GDP, in 1993 
and 1994 they went under 3 %. This improvement was due to the introduction of a 
new income tax regime, the broadening of the tax base, the imposition of a value 
added tax and strong recovery in economic growth in both years (which added to 
budget revenue)36. 
                                                 
34 Until May 1995, the exchange rate was set up to follow a crawling peg to a basket of currencies. In 1995 the National 
Bank of Poland (NBP) re-adjusted that policy by introducing a managed float for the currency, under which domestic banks 
freely set their exchange around the central bank's rate. Such rate is set daily by the NBP after considering world market 
rates and devaluation of the zloty. The devaluation of the new zloty against its basket - consisting of the US dollar (45%), the 
DM (35%), the pound sterling (10%), the French franc (5%) and the Swiss franc (5%) - was reduced from 1.2% per month to 
1.0% in January 1996. The central rate is adjusted under a crawling-peg regime, and the zloty can fluctuate within margins of 
+/-7.0% around the central rate. A new Foreign Exchange Law, which took effect from the beginning of 1995, removed 
some exchange restrictions on current international transactions. (Poland: March 1996, Barclays Bank Country Report, 1996 
Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, March 1, 1996.) 
35 POLAND:  Transition indicators, EBRD Transition Report, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 1994. 
36 Poland:  March 1996, Barclays Bank Country Report, 1996 Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
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 The Mazowiecki government formulated its mass privatization program in 
1990. It aimed to sell 50 % of state enterprises (some 8,000) within a period of five 
years. The implementation was slow and resulted mostly in passing the relevant 
legislation by the parliament in 1993. The legislation also designed the creation of 
privately managed National Investment Funds (NIFs). The majority of shares 
introduced through privatization of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) will be held by 
the NIFs, with the balance going to the Treasury and employees of respective 
companies. A comprehensive privatization program was introduced in 1994. Its first 
stage covered more than 400 large SOEs valued at $US 2.6 billion (additional 100 
companies were added to this phase in 1995). The privatization of the banking sector 
has been slow, and privatization of strategic industries (fuel, power, coal mining and 
shipyards) remained politically sensitive37.  
   As Table 2 shows, Poland's leftist governments have set tight fiscal policies, 
despite campaign pledges to reduce the social cost of economic reform. In July 1994, 
the finance minister presented the 1995 budget which estimated a 5 % growth in 
GDP, a 22 % inflation and a substantial reduction in the devaluation of the zloty. It 
also provided for lower income tax in expectation of increased profitability of state 
enterprises and increased incomes from customs and indirect taxes38. As indicated 
in Table 6, the economic outcomes of 1995 proved it to be a realistic strategy. 
 The strong inflow of foreign exchange resulted to a large extent from rising 
export revenues in the unrecorded sectors of the economy and from speculative 
capital inflows taking advantage of relatively high yields on the zloty deposit 
accounts. Monetary policy was tightened during 1995. Interest rates were increased 
in early 1996, but were subsequently reduced as monthly inflation slowed. Relatively 
high interest rates continued to encourage  
capital inflows, contributing to money supply growth and aggravating inflation39. In 
order to limit the inflow of foreign exchange, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) 
abandoned the so-called "internal convertibility" and floated the Polish zloty (PLZ) on 
May 16, 1995. PLZ became also current account convertible on June 1, 1996. 
   As mentioned earlier, in October 1994, prime minister Pawlak decided to 
start a Mass Privatization Program (MPP), involving the transfer of 60 % of the equity 
of 444 companies to 15 NIFs. Shares in the NIFs will be sold publicly on the Warsaw 
stock Exchange (WSE). Another 30 % of the equity will be distributed free to 
                                                                                                                                                        
March 1, 1996. 
37 Poland:  March 1996, Barclays Bank Country Report, 1996 Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996. 
38 POLAND: Review 1996, Europe Review World of Information, Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996. 
39 Poland:  March 1996, Barclays Bank Country Report, 1996 Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996. 
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employees, pensioners and social funds, with government securing the remaining 10 
%40. 
  The government's economic policies of the last three governments were 
contained in two documents prepared by the finance minister Kolodko: "Strategy for 
Poland" (for years 1994-97) and "Package 2000" (adopted by the governments in 
1994 and 1996 respectively). If the targets in the new program were met, Poland 
might be considered as the new EU member state. One of the goals is to bring the 
budget deficit down to 1.7 % of GDP and inflation to 4.9 % in 2000, with the annual 
growth at above 5 %. According to the program, the average annual real GDP growth 
would be at 5.7 % over the next five years41. GDP growth is forecast to slow to 5.5 % 
in 1997, 5.3 % in 1998 and 5.1 % in both 1999 and 2000. Consumption would 
decrease to 3.2 % in 1997 and 1998, and 3.1 % in both 1999 and 2000. Investment 
is forecast to increase by 8.5 % in 1997, and by 9 % per annum in the following 
three years. Exports and imports are expected to increase (respectively) by 12.4 % 
and 8 % in 1997, 10 % and 7 % in 1998, 8.4 % and 6.5 % in 1999, and 8.3 % and 
6.5 % in the year 200042. 
 One of the key challenges remained to be confronted by the Polish 
governments is the reform of the burdensome social security system, especially the 
pension requirements, which account for some 15 % of GDP. Another remaining 
problems are to improve the financial and banking systems and reduce inflation to 
single digit figure. The latter one remains to be the key element of the monetary 
policy. Although the inflation dropped from about 555 % in 1990 to about 30 % in 
1994, it still remained relatively high at 22 % in 1995 and 1996.  Government's 
plans are to reduce it to a single digit number in 1997, but among the obstacles in 
achieving that are the indexing of both wages and pensions as well as substantial 
inflows of short-term capital43 (especially foreign currency deposits that were 
induced by relatively high interest rates and stability of the zloty since 1991). Initial 
reforms of the social security system are to begin by the second quarter of 1997. 
They will probably consist of introduction of private pension funds with 
tax-deductible contributions and minority stakes in SOEs, as well as of reduction of 
special pensions for some categories of the workers. The issue, however, is going to a 
hot one, marked with tensions and populist election campaigning.  
 
                                                 
40 POLAND: Review 1996, Europe Review World of Information, Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996. 
41 There are two scenarios under the program: optimistic when GDP could increase by 8.0% and pessimistic when it is 
below 3.0%. 
42 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
43 It is estimated that total money supply grew about 32 % in 1994, 39 in 1995, and some 25 in 1996 (Poland: January 1996, 
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The Turkish Experiment With Reform 
 Much has been written about economic reorientation of Turkey since the military 
coup of 1980.44  Economic policy reform in Turkey began in 1980, following the adoption of 
the IMF sponsored stabilization and adjustment program and continues to this day.  During 
this period, different governments pushed ahead with reforms with varying degrees of 
success and failure but political transformation form authoritarianism has significantly 
lagged behind its economic counterpart.  With regard to economic liberalization two 
important dates are crucial to remember.   
 The first is January 24, 1980, when the coalition government of Süleyman Demirel 
announced a wide sweeping reform package under the IMF guidance.45  These reforms 
were in response to the bottleneck problems the Turkish economy experienced during the 
second half of the 1970s as it industrialization reached a crucial point and transition to 
export-oriented growth became essential.  However, the government was unable to 
implement these policies due to social and political unrest in the country.  Therefore, the 
task of policy implementation fell into the lap of the generals following the coup of 
September 12, 1980.  Reform began with the generals and got underway under Özal's 
government following return to civilian rule in 1983.  The 1980 program identified two major 
goals, stabilization and structural transformation which are still underway today.  The 
second important austerity package is the policy response of former Prime Minister Tansu 
Çiller to currency crisis of January 1994.  Once again, the Turkish government visited the 
IMF and announced harsh economic austerity to stabilize the Turkish lira and the financial 
markets.  Taken together, the period between 1980-97 can be summarized according to 
criteria recommended by Yavuz Canevi in evaluation of the specific components of reform 
packages.  Table 3 compares these policies against the various governments which were in 
power during this period. 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Janet Matthews, Information Services.) 
44 Some suggestions for this reading include Yavuz Canevi, “Turkey,” in John Williamson, ed., The 
Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington:  Institute for International Economics, 1994); C. H. 
Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Economy (Hemingford Grey, UK:  Eothen Press, 1990); Atila Eralp, 
Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yesilada, eds., The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey 
(Westport, Mass:  Praeger, 1993); William Hale, The Political and Economic Development of Modern 
Turkey (London:  Croom Helm, 1981); Z. Y. Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy (London:  
Routledge, 1988); Anne O. Krueger and Okan H. Aktan, Swimming Against the Tide:  Turkish Trade 
Reform in the 1980s (San Francisco:  International Center for Economic Growth, 1992); Ziya Onis and 
James Riedel, Economic Crises and Long-Term Growth in Turkey (Washington:  World Bank, 1993); 
Dani Rodrik, “Comment,” in John Williamson, ed., The Political Economy; Birol Yesilada and Mahir 
Fisunoglu, “Assessing the January.”  
45Yesilada and Fisunoglu, "Assessing the January ," p. 187. 
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 The information in Table 4 show that the track record of the Turkish governments on 
reform have been mixed.  A “yes” means that there were efforts made to implement reforms 
in the specified area, “no” means that the issue was not addressed and a “yes/no” indicator 
simply means that reforms remained on paper only.  The nature of the coalitions and strong 
opposition form other political parties and organized labor often limited the capacity of 
governments to tackle such difficult issues as privatization and prioritization of public 
expenditures.  Often, it is the case that new governments enjoy a brief period of 
“honeymoon” with the opposition and able to carry out reforms.  However, there is more 
involved in examining the record of these governments.  One needs to look at the nature of 
the opposition, quality of the government’s economic think tank, leadership of its Prime 
Minister, and the nature of its reform program (including the items cited in Table 4).  John 
Williamson provides a series of hypotheses, or a check list, for examining this aspect of the 
problem (see Table 5). 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 In evaluating these hypotheses similar notations are used as in Table 4.  Once again, 
the track record of the governments is mixed.  One important observation is that every 
government came to power with a commitment for a comprehensive policy reform.  One 
exception to this is the former Çiller-Yilmaz coalition of 1996.  Nevertheless, in each case, 
the comprehensiveness of the respective programs remained on paper only.  Even under the 
IMF sponsored austerity packages, in 1980 and 1994, the governments swayed away from 
their goals for political reasons.  Only two leaders, Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan, had 
a clear vision for the future of Turkey’s economy.  Özal’s vision reflected the widely accepted 
economic doctrines of capitalism whereas Erbakan’s views clearly follow the Islamist 
doctrine. We will return to the latter’s views at a later section.   
 The “yes” notation during the military rule period is also due to his presence as the 
economic advisor to the coup government.  He was the architect of the January 24, 1980 
austerity package and continued to adhere to its principles during his rule in 1983-91.  
However, one should be careful in distinguishing between Özal’s early years and his last 
years in office, in the late 1980s.  After the 1987 national elections, the Özal government 
slacked off in pushing for privatization and to control public spending.  Nevertheless, Özal's 
economic reforms, resulting in complete reorientation of the Turkish economy from an 
inward oriented market to integration with global capitalism was the first economic 
revolution since Atatürk's time.   
 During the 1980s, Turgut Özal, who was the visionary leader similar to the first 
image criteria found in the formulations of Cohen and Cerny, reformed the Ministry of 
Finance and in 1983 absorbed the Treasury Department.  He also created the 
Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade.  According to Yavuz Canevi "in this way, 
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the Prime Minister consolidated his direction of all the major agencies of economic and 
finance management;  the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade, the Central 
bank, the Undersecretariat of the State Planning Organization, and the newly established 
Extra-Budgetary Fund Administration."46 
 He also established the Monetary and credit Committee as the technical forum to 
discuss policy issues and to be chaired by the Minister of Finance.  The Economic 
coordination council, headed by the Prime Minister, was the corresponding political forum 
and attended by the key ministers of the cabinet and technocrats.  these two bodies 
considered short-cuts to the long political decision-making processes of the government and 
the national assembly.  This way, the Prime Minister got his decision implemented very 
quickly and often without legislative oversight.  With these institutional changes, Özal 
embarked upon a series of reforms aimed at liberalizing the Turkish investment, foreign 
trade, exchange rate, and fiscal regimes.  Some privatization also took place.  Without going 
into details of these efforts, one can summarize the achievements of Özal as: 
On the positive side . . . as a result of more realistic exchange rates and the 
government's export-promotion policies, export earnings increased significantly and, 
by the end of [1980s], the current account balance finally emerged out of its 
perennial deficit.  . . .  the share of industrial products increased from 36 % to 78 % 
of total exports.  Also, the share of total trade in GDP doubled . . liberalization of the 
investment regime attracted a sizable stock of foreign investment into the Turkish 
economy.  On the negative side . . . (1)  The export-oriented model failed to eliminate 
trade deficits; (2) The money supply (M2) has shown a steady increase since 1980; 
(3) The high inflation rate has almost returned to its previous levels; (4) Real wages 
of workers and bureaucrats have declined significantly; (5) The income-distribution 
pattern worsened as relative factor  shares in national income shifted away from 
popular sectors to profits, interest, and rents income; and (6) Özal government's 
reliance on excessive borrowing from abroad resulted in a very large external debt.47 
In another evaluation of stabilization and adjustment in Turkey, Dani Rodrik explains that 
the problem of unfinished reform is due to the governments’ failure to capitalize on timing: 
In some sense, Turkey’s real political economy story is its failure to deal adequately 
with the public-sector deficit (and the problem of state enterprises in particular) 
when the government had a real window of opportunity. . . In 1980-81, the generals 
did not do it [and] capital inflows from abroad hid the need for fiscal reform.  In late 
1983, when Özal won the elections (thanks to a change in electoral laws), he spent 
too much energy on microeconomic reforms such as trade and financial sector 
liberalization.  . . overall result; the Turkish macroeconomy remains rife with 
                                                 
46 Yavuz Canevi, "Turkey" pp. 185-186. 
47Yesilada and Fosunoglu, "Assessing the January," pp. 206-207. 
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instability, with the public-sector-borrowing-requirement hovering above 10 % of 
GDP, and inflation at an annual rate of around 65-70 %.48 
The significance of the above observation is that the post-Özal governments inherited 
unfinished reforms.  Under such conditions, like coalition governments, the new leadership 
had to cope with increasing economic pressures, both outside-in and inside-out, to 
complete the necessary reforms as the Turkish economy became more integrated with 
global financial markets. 
 During the last few years, different Turkish government coalitions continued to press 
ahead with restructuring of the economy which had begun in 1980.  However, the coalition 
governments of Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller (first with Yilmaz and later with 
Erbakan) failed to maintain tight monetary policies, allowed inflation to run at an average 
rate of 60-90 % per year, and borrowed heavily in foreign markets.  At the end of 1996, 
foreign debt rose to $78 billion.  This represented a major rise in foreign debt which stood at 
$38 billion in 1988 and $16 billion when the 1980 austerity measures were introduced.49  
Çiller, the first female Prime Minister, paid for this irresponsible practice when she was 
faced with downgrading of Turkey's long-term debt rating by the Moody's, from BAA to BA1 
(considered a "junk" rating) and a serious speculative attacks on the Turkish lira in 1994.  
Following the Moody's action, the Standard & Poor's revised its long-term foreign currency 
rating for Turkey from BBB to BBB minus.  In an attempt to prevent economic collapse and 
to avoid knocking on the doors of the IMF for assistance, Çiller's government undertook 
series of economic decisions aimed at restoring confidence in the economy. 
 The first such decision was the announcement of a new program of tax changes 
designed to close the country's budget gap and offset expected losses from the move to a 
customs union with the European Union (EU) in 1995.  These measures, however, failed to 
prevent the further downgrading of Turkey's credit by the agencies Moody's and Standard & 
Poor.  Following this announcement, the lira went into a chaotic fluctuation against major 
currencies.  As pressures mounted, the central bank announced on April 5, that it will no 
longer  intervene to support the lira and declared the official exchange rate to be 32,050 TL 
per one US dollar-representing a 38 % devaluation from the previous day.  On the same 
day, the government disclosed a new austerity package to stabilize the economy. 
 The first part included the stabilization measures.  These were price increases on 
government-controlled commodities, an investment freeze and one-off tax charges on the 
rich ($2.1 billion), a 15 % real wage cut in the public sector, laying off 30,000 state workers, 
and reform of the farm support policies to underpin a fiscal program to slash the budget 
deficit from TL47,000 billion to TL9,000 billion during the second quarter of 1994.  The 
second part was comprised of adjustment policies which included faster privatization of 
                                                 
48 Rodrik, “Comment,” pp. 213-215. 
49Ibid., p. 201 
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state enterprises (to raise $3.5 billion), closure of the nonprofit making state enterprises, 
and reform of the Central Bank by increasing its autonomy and reducing the extent to 
which it provided funds to help balance the budget. 
 Despite the tough austerity measures of the Çiller government, Turkey was unlikely 
to get through these economic crisis alone.  Much depended on an agreement with the IMF 
because without the Fund's approval Turkey could not return to international capital 
markets to secure foreign credits.  Therefore, the government went back to the IMF for 
approval. 
 The outcome of going to the IMF was once more a return to orthodoxy in Turkey. The 
subsequent signing of the letter of intent represent the cooperative nature of the game in 
that the two sides agree on a set of binding agreements which are enforceable.  This letter 
was necessary for releasing of $250 million from the Fund to support Turkey's balance of 
payments and send a signal to international lenders that the country was once again 
creditworthy.   
 All in all, the IMF agreed to a two-year $756.2 million stand-by loan in July 1994, 
and the Turkish government approached the World Bank for loans to support economic 
restructuring, particularly in the public sector.  According to the World Bank officials who 
assessed the days of these negotiations, "Turkey had to consider privatization of her state 
owned economic enterprises, eliminate state subsidies, modernize the tax and social 
security system, and sweep away bureaucratic red tape.  Determination, or the lack of it, to 
pursue public sector reform will shape Turkey's business environment in the years to 
come."50  As we will discuss in the next section, the overall outcome of Turkey's 
stabilization showed mixed results in 1994.  The government's decision to practically stop 
all purchasing and payments during the second and third quarter, helped ease the balance-
of-payments problem.  Productivity slowed down, money supply shrunk, and the lira lost 
ground against other hard currencies making Turkish exports attractive in foreign markets.  
By the end of the year, the economy showed a negative growth rate of 6.0 %.  However, 
despite the initial monetary discipline, the government failed to meet the target rates in 
controlling the inflation, and initiating the much needed privatization program. 
 With growing domestic opposition and the inability of the government to meet some 
of the target specified in the 1994 letter of intent, the Çiller government found it necessary 
to go back to the IMF to renegotiate a new letter of intent in 1995.  The minister of state, 
Aykon Dogan, submitted a new letter of intent to the IMF on February 24, 1995, following 
eleven days of talks with the Fund's officials in Ankara.  The major aim of the letter of intent 
was to obtain a six-month extension on the stand-by agreement.  
                                                 
50Interviews with Christian Poortman, Tanju Yürükoglu, and Suman Mehra of the World Bank.  June 
30, 1995. 
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 The new letter of intent raised the target for annual average inflation for 1995 from 
43 % to 70 %; increased the central government budget deficit by 11 % to 220 trillion liras 
from 198 trillion liras; planned for a public-sector-borrowing-requirement around 6.0 % of 
GDP (an expected decline from 10 % in 1994); targeted a current-account surplus of $1.4 
billion; a target GNP growth rate adjusted to 3.8 % from the earlier projection of 4.4 %; and 
serious privatization efforts.51 
 The IMF approved the letter of intent on March 9, 1995, and extended Turkey's 
stand-by agreement for another six-months.  As a result of this decision, the stand-by 
financing increased by $157.5 million bringing the total from the facility to SDR 610.5 
million ($952.4 million).  The acting managing director of the IMF, Stanley Fisher, 
announced that these policies strengthened Turkey's external position and that the Fund 
expected inflation to come down and provide for sustained economic growth in 1995.  
Despite the IMF's approval of the letter of intent, the Turkish government suffered a serious 
setback in its efforts of maintain the support of the World bank in Turkish structural reform 
policies.  The World bank withdrew its support for structural reform in Turkey because of 
the government's inability to carry out meaningful privatization policy and its weak political 
capacity to initiate civil service reform and the overhaul of the social security system.52 
 Following December 1995 national elections, Çiller and Yilmaz formed another 
coalition aimed at keeping the Islamist Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan from forming 
the government.53  This coalition’s economic reform program was basically followed the 
previous Çiller-led coalition governments and were short lived as the alliance fell apart 
within three months.  Following this split, Çiller then formed another coalition government - 
with the Islamist WP in July 1996.  
 Although the new coalition endorsed Çiller’s economic program the WP has its own 
hidden agenda to advance their Islamist cause based on its Milli Görüs (the National View) 
and Adil Düzen (the Just Order) views.54  With this problem aside, the new coalition did 
                                                 
51 EIU, Country Report:  Turkey, 2nd Quarter.  (London:  EIU, 1995), pp. 17-19 
52 According to Christian Poortman, Division Chief for EC 1 (Turkey, Bulgaria, Cyprus, FYR 
Macedonia, Portugal, and Romania Department) of the World Bank, the World Bank did not see 
Çiller's current program sustainable.  The government quietly indicated that it could not accept the 
tough measures for public sector adjustment (civil service reform, comprehensive privatization of the 
state enterprises, and social security reform) due to political conditions in the country and the weak 
nature of the government coalition.  Thus, the World bank pulled out of supporting the government. 
53 For a detailed discussion of this period see Birol A. Yesilada, “The Refah Party Phenomenon in 
Turkey,”  unpublished conference paper. 
54 National View and Just Order are two comprehensive “reform” packages that the WP wants to 
install instead of the IMF-prescribed orthodox economic reforms.  According to these two packages, 
Turkey’s problems can be solved as follows:  (1)“Single Solution:” (i) Reject Western imitation and 
adopt Milli Görüs , (ii)  reject Western capitalism and apply Adil Düzen, (iii) develop moral and material 
well being of citizens, (iv) reject Western dependency and promote Islamic unity, and, (v) realize 
Islamic justice [in Turkey]; (2)  Stop the expansion of Western style political parties; (3)  Instate Adil 
Ekonomik Düzen; (4) Adopt an independent foreign policy for Turkey, and; (5) Promote Islamic unity.  
Milli Görüs emphasizes five important points: (1) Domestic peace; (2) Unity between the State and 
nation (Devlet-Millet Bütünlügü); (3) Revival of the “Great Turkey” (Büyük Türkiye) torch; (4) Spiritual 
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put into effect two important policies which had remained on paper during the previo
coalition periods - public expenditure prioritization and privatization.  The most significant 
privatization news came in January 1997, when the Constitutional Court rejected appeals 
to stop the privatization of Turk Telekom.  Furthermore, the Williamson Hypotheses show 
major differences between the current coalition government and the previous ones.  The 
most dramatic difference between the current Erbakan-Ciller coalition and the previous 
ones (except Özal) is that the WP-wing of the coalition does have a leader with a vision.  It 
also has a direct appeal to the public, and favors liberalization of economic regimes.  
However, the coalition’s economic program does not include fiscal discipline, a tax reform, 
or reform of property rights. 
us 
 
THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL FLOWS ON THE POLISH AND TURKISH ECONOMIES 
AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
 In discussing the policy outcomes of the recent austerity and reform measures in 
Poland and Turkey, we will first present a brief overview of the macroeconomic outcomes, 
discuss developments in business and finance and assess the possible links between 
integration with international financial markets and domestic. 
 
Macroeconomic Trends in Poland 
 Poland's economic stabilization and reform programs, of the early 1990's 
have proved successful and the country seems to be now in the process of a strong 
economic recovery.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
 Tax revenues and savings in public spending reduced substantially the 
budget deficit. Inflation is falling gradually, balance of payments stabilized, and 
there were large inflows of short-term foreign capital. Polish exports increased 
sharply (continuing since 1992, but especially in 1995, due to strong demand on the 
European markets that year), followed by surge in foreign exchange reserves.  In 
June 1995 Poland reentered global capital markets, which resulted in increase of 
                                                                                                                                                        
growth, and; (5) Economic Growth.  As it can be seen, the WP does have a very comprehensive 
program, and its leader - a seventy-four-year-old veteran leader - has been leading the WP and its 
predecessors for more than twenty years.  The WP, in addition, has been very successful in directly 
appealing to public.  It has a very peculiar party structure and party organization which share 
similarities with Duveger’s ‘branch party,’ ‘cell party,’ and ‘militia party.’Through many tarikat 
(religious order), the WP branches down to large numbers of people.  In addition, just like cell parties, 
it permeates all aspects of its members’ lives from work to recreation.  Hence, the party ideology is a 
philosophy that extends beyond the political realm, and provides  its members a way to discover truth 
and frame their decision making.  Furthermore, the radical faction of the WP is similar to Duveger’s 
militia party with armed militants.  The only reason for their participating into the regime is to try to 
bring about its demise.  For more information see Yesilada, “The Refah Phenomenon.” 
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foreign capital. Unemployment, although dropping, still remains high. 
 The original reforms focused on lowering various consumer subsidies and 
entitlements, with direct consumer subsides being cut from 10 % of GDP in 1988 to 
less than 1 % in 1995. But, government spending on unemployment and pensions 
remains high and drives total government spending to some 51 % of GDP55. As a 
result of the radical stabilization program, the economy had started to expand in 
1992. Government attempts to slow inflation are likely to be frustrated by continuing 
high inflationary policies of pensions and wage indexation, as well as substantial 
increase of money supply related to foreign capital inflows. International reserves 
(excluding gold) increased substantially by over $US 9 billion in 1995 to almost $US 
15 billion in 1996, which is due mainly to speculative short-term capital inflows 
precipitated by the Treasury-bill market, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
unrecorded trade inflows56. The net foreign exchange reserves in August 1996 were 
estimated at $US 21,930 million, and official foreign exchange reserves at $US 
17,970 million.  Although exports are increasing, reducing the debt-to-exports ratio, 
the current account deficit is decreasing57. 
 Due to increasing economic activity and reduced import tariffs, imports 
doubled between 1994 and 1996, driving the current account deficit from $US 900 
million in 1994 to $US 1.9 billion in 1995 and 7,7 billion in 199658. The tendency of 
strong import is likely to continue due to further reduction of custom duties. It is 
forecast that Poland's capital accounts will strengthen and that it will not seek a 
further standby agreements with the IMF. Also, borrowing from other official 
agencies is to go down to less than $US 600 million, compared with $US 900 million 
raised in 1995 and $US  1.5 billion in 1994. FDI is anticipated to accelerate due to a 
substantial capacity of Poland's domestic market and awaited speed up of 
privatization59. 
 As Table 6 shows, in 1996 Poland returned to its output levels from 1989, 
after achieving real GDP growth of 3.8 % in 1993, 5 in 1994, 6.5 in 1995, and 5.5 in 
1996. In $US terms growth has been even greater than in the zloty terms. GDP in 
1990 was equivalent to $US 59 billion, in 1995 it went up to $US 115 billion (PLZ 
275 billion), in 1996 to $134.5 billion, and is estimated to be $149.4 billion in 
199760. The government plans for budget deficit in the next four years estimate to 
                                                 
55 Poland: January 1996, Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Janet Matthews, Information Services. 
56 Poland:  March 1996, Barclays Bank Country Report, 1996 Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996 
57 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
58 Sources: Poland: January 1996, Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Janet Matthews, Information Services, and The 
Financial Times, March 26, 1997. 
59 Poland: January 1996, Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Janet Matthews, Information Services. 
60 Sources: Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, 
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be within the challenging Maastricht boundaries of less than 3 % of GDP61.  
 Despite both IMF and World Bank made increasing privatization a condition 
of financing the London Club debt reduction, and of lending $US 790 million for a 
19-month extension to the standby agreement of August 1994, the privatization of 
8,000 of public enterprises has been very slow since 199062. Under the MPP, 512 
firms have been distributed among 15 NIFs. Over 20 million people bought vouchers 
worth PLZ 20, which are exchanged for one share in each of 15 NIFs. The funds have 
control over those firms whose total book value is estimated at PLZ 6.3 billion ($US 
2.5 billion). Capital privatization is also being pursued with 2,000 new companies 
designated for sale under a new privatization law in the near future. Initially, such 
privatization was expected to raise PLZ 2.5 billion as part of a total PLZ 6 billion 
from privatization revenues in the budget. However, since privatization remains a 
source of tension between the coalition partners as well as a hot issue in the 
upcoming elections, the immediate privatization plans remain uncertain.  
 The original Kolodko’s “Strategy for Poland” targeted a reduction in 
unemployment in 1997 to 14 %, which is likely to be met. He was forecasting that 
rate will drop to 10-11 % in 1997, despite more tight requirements for 
unemployment benefits currently in place.63 However, until now, economic growth 
has contributed to only a marginal decline in unemployment (it was at 14.3 % in 
mid-1996 and 14 % at the end of the year), down from a peak of 16.4 % in 1993. It is 
forecast that the rate of unemployment will decline slowly because the significant 
business activity should generate new jobs. But, job losses will also rise due to 
reductions in the public sector and continuing industrial restructuring (mostly in 
traditional industries such as shipyards and coal). 
  
Financial Services 
 In 1989, nine commercial banks were established from branch offices of the 
National Bank of Poland. The Banking Law of 1989, the Act on the National Bank of 
Poland of 1989 (both amended in 1992), and The Law on the Financial Restructuring 
of Enterprises and Banks of 1993 provided the regulatory framework for banking 
operations. After recapitalization, the branches of NBP were deemed for privatization. 
                                                                                                                                                        
October 1, 1996, and The Financial Times, March 26, 1997. 
61 Originally, the government targeted a deficit of 2.3% of GDP in 1997, but the projections have been raise twice to 2.6 and 
2.8%, due to the government-proposed tax cuts in October. The finance minister, Kolodko, wanted to reduce present income 
tax rates from 21%, 33% and 45%, to 20%, 30% and 40% respectively, but the cabinet overruled him, and proposed them to 
be at 20%, 31% and 43%. Despite these proposals, the parliament voted for income tax rates of 17%, 20%, 33% and 45%, 
which is likely to put the 3% goal into jeopardy. The corporate tax has been cut by the parliament from 40 to 38% as well. 
(Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996.) 
62 POLAND: Review 1996, Europe Review World of Information, Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996. 
63 Kolodko resigned as minister in February 1997. 
 26 
First two state banks, which were in a better financial situation, were privatized in 
1993 and early 199464. Privatization of the banking sector remains under the 
control of the finance ministry, and is expected to progress65.  New policies, after 
recapitalization, included adoption of tougher supervision and tighter liquidity 
requirements. Also, the government has developed a plan to consolidate the weaker 
and smaller banks before, in 1998, the Polish banking market fully opens to foreign 
competition66. 
 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange 
 The WSE was reopened in April 1991.  Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
WSE (or the WIG as it is referred to in Polish).  Marked points (e.g., A, B,...) indicate 
important points in time when events occurred that may have impacted on market 
performance.  A long term economic recession and political instability created a very 
unfavorable climate for investment in the first two years of trading. In 1991-1993, 
prices of shares remained relatively stable. Although high interest rate on bank 
deposits discouraged domestic and foreign investment, the third quarter of 1992 
brought a growing interest of foreign investors in the Polish market. Indeed, in the 
last quarter of 1992 the Polish economy continued to recover (despite the inflation 
rate around 40 %). Relative political stability encouraged first bullish trends in the 
stock market. A first unprecedented boom on the WSE was recorded during fall of 
1993 and the first quarter of 1994 (A). The most important factors contributing to 
that were:  
(a)Positive reports on the Polish economy by foreign financial institutions at 
the end of 1993 and early 1994;  
(b)Growing private sector (in September 1993 accounting for 46 % of 
employees);  
(c)Increasing industrial production in 1993-4; 
(d)Decreasing inflation at the end of 1993; 
(e)Good financial results of the listed companies (markedly above those of the 
economy); 
(f)Passage of the new budget in the Sejm on February 15, 1994; and 
(g)The NBP lowering its main interest rates by 3 % on February 22, 1994 
(which induced the commercial banks to greater reduce their interest 
rates). 
                                                 
64 POLAND:  Transition indicators, EBRD Transition Report, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 1994. 
65 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
66 Poland: July 1996, Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, July 
1, 1996. 
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[Figure 1 here] 
 
 In March 1994 the WSE values hit their all-time high.  Despite good 
performance of the Polish economy, the rest of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 
witnessed a prolonged recession (the fifteen-month lows were noted in March, 
1995)67, and the stock market became very volatile (B). The most important socio-
economic event at the turn of the 1995 was the re-denomination of the Polish zloty 
(at the rate of 10,000 to 1). In the second quarter of 1995 WSE recovered from the 
protracted slump of the previous year (C). Rapidly raising foreign currency reserves 
led the NBP to introduce in May a flexible foreign currency exchange rate which 
resulted in  appreciation of the zloty's value, subsequently ameliorated by the NBP's 
4 % cut in interest rates.  
  The WIG index lost 11 % at the end of 1995, the greatest monthly fall in the 
value of index since January 1995, as tensions increased by the intensifying 
presidential election campaign (D). Investors fears were intensified by two additional 
factors: numerous new listings of companies listed on WSE and the inauguration of 
sale of privatization certificates through the MPP. In the first months of 1996 Polish 
macroeconomic situation continued to be good and the first quarter of 1996 was one 
of the most profitable periods on the WSE since 1994. When the NBP lowered 
interest rates in early January, the WIG gained 16 % over the first ten-day period of 
the month. At the end of January WIG gained 37 % (E). The January rise was mainly 
the result of growing interest in acquiring stock by large, very often foreign, 
investors. Economic growth remained high in 1996, resulting in each of the three 
official WSE indices gaining more than 80 % in the first six months (F). As of the 
third quarter of 1996, the total stock market capitalization of $US 9 billion equaled 7 
% of Poland's GDP. 
 
Foreign Debt 
 In September 1989, before launching his reform plan, Balcerowicz requested 
a substantial reduction of Polish debt at his speech for IMF and World Bank68. His 
aim was to seek a massive debt relief instead of asking for countless refinancing 
agreements69. A year later in similar address to the IMF and World Bank he 
emphasized the successes of Polish economic reform and pressed for the debt 
reduction again. Initially, the Polish government was seeking an 80 % reduction. 
                                                 
67 FFO - Updater, August 1995, p.27. 
68 The Paris Club controls Poland's debt owed to the Western governments, whereas the London Club the debt owed to the 
commercial lenders. 
69 Bjork "The Uses..., pp.100-101. 
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Later it reduced its demands to 40 %. As the data in Table 7 show, at the end of 
1990 Poland's external debt in convertible currencies was about $US 49.5 billion.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
 In March 1992 the Western governments (the Paris Club) reached a 
compromise and agreed to forgive 50 % of Poland's official debt. Shortly after that 
compromise, the U.S. unilaterally wrote-off an additional 20 %, followed by France's 
10 %70. Final agreement of May 1994 with the Paris Club laid ground for a 
settlement with the London Club of commercial bank creditors in September of the 
same year. It reduced debt by about 43 % ($US 6.6 billion), restructuring it into 
long-term bonds71 (valued at some $US 2.4 billion) which were bought back by 
Poland for 41 % of the value and the remainder exchanged for 30-year bonds at a 
value of $US 4.6 billion72. Debt reduction under these agreements reduced Poland's 
external debt from $US 48.7 billion in early 1993 to $US 44 billion in 199473. The 
decline in debt, coupled with economic growth, improved Polish debt/GDP ratio to 
some 35 % in 1995, from 45.9 % in 199474. Polish external debt declined further to 
$US 42 billion in 1995 as a result of a mutual debt cancellation between Poland and 
Russia. Renewed borrowing in 1996 increased Poland's external debt to $US 43.1 
billion in 1996, but as a percentage of GDP, the debt fell from 35 % in 1995 to 33 % 
in 1996, and is projected to fall to 31.6 in 199775. 
 
Political Outcomes 
   Since 1989, the political situation has been characterized by the competition 
between the movements/parties having roots in the anti-communist Solidarity and 
the former communists. The Solidarity-based parties become highly factionalized 
and unable to form larger and stable coalitions. The ex-communists, although 
consisting of a number of small groupings, remained united and centered on the 
ex-communist Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SDRP), DLA (SLD). The 
economic austerity programs of 1990-1992 fostered widespread social dissatisfaction 
                                                 
70 In response Japan blocked its $US500mln loan to Poland. 
71 The London Club unprecedently reduced both the outstanding principal and unpaid interest on the debt. (Bjork "The 
Uses..., p.117) 
72  The agreement will reduce Poland's annual interest payments to $US400 million. The $US1.9 billion cost of the buy-back 
is to be financed through loans from the IMF, World Bank and Polish central reserves. Polish authorities estimate that the 
deal should result in over $US1 billion in additional foreign investment inflows. (POLAND: Review 1996, Europe Review 
World of Information, Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, March 1, 1996.) 
73 Poland: January 1996, Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Janet Matthews, Information Services. 
74 Poland:  March 1996, Barclays Bank Country Report, 1996 Quest Economics: Janet Matthews Information Services, 
March 1, 1996. 
75 Sources: Poland: January 1996, Bank of America WIS Country Outlooks, Janet Matthews, Information Services, and The 
Financial Times, March 26, 1997. 
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with the adverse consequences of the reforms, which lead to the emergence of a 
DLA/PSL coalition government at the 1993 elections. The parties which emerged 
from Solidarity, after easily winning the parliamentary elections of 1989 and 1991, 
very soon lost widespread public support and in addition to losing control of 
parliament, surrendered to an ex-communist in late 1995 the presidency as well. 
 The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for September 1997 
(although such timing is uncertain) and Polish political life in the nearest time will 
be marked by maneuvering on the part of the government and the opposition. 
Despite political uncertainties, it is believed that Polish economy is substantially 
insulated from political concerns, and that prospects for Poland joining NATO in 
1999 and the EU in 2002 are unlikely to be affected by internal political 
competition76. The new constitution remains to be drafted. It is believed that its 
blueprint will not be approved by parliament before spring 1997, and very likely that 
the referendum  approving it will not be held until the fall parliamentary elections77. 
 
External Factors: The European Union and The IMF 
 Poland applied for EU membership in April 1994. The biggest concern during 
the process of admission remains Poland's large (1/4 of the labor force) inefficient 
agricultural sector. Also, the size of population of the country (Poland would be the 
sixth most populous EU member state), whose large part lives in poverty78 is a 
problem. With all probability Poland will be one of the first Eastern European post-
communist countries to join EU, but its admission may be loaded with exemptions 
and special clauses79. 
 Today in Poland both economic policy and the new laws are to a large extent 
geared towards convergence with the EU norms, in order to smoothen the country's 
future admission. Although the EMU criteria will be difficult to satisfy for such 
young free-market economy as Polish, in 1996 the ratio of debt to GDP dropped 
below 60 % and the budget deficit was below 3 % of GDP, what gives Poland a 
comparable standing with some of the EU member states. The other key economic 
problems on the path to admission are to reduce inflation and to lower long-term 
interest rates (most resistance to these goals comes from the PSL)80. 
                                                 
76 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
77 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
78 Even if estimates of Polish finance minister, Kolodko, that GDP in the year 2000 will rise to $US200bn, are met, the per 
capita GDP would be below $US5,000. More than Portugal's $US2,984 per capita GDP when it joined EU in 1986. 
79 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
80 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
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 Although in 1995 paid off its debts to the IMF, the latter still continues to 
monitor the economy at regular intervals, in order to reassure foreign businesses 
and investors that the government follows responsible policies. IMF also plays an 
advisory role to the government as well as gives its endorsement regarding certain 
monetary issues. When the NBP decided, in the third quarter of 1995, to move 
ahead with the full zloty convertibility, it petitioned the IMF for approval81. Although 
recently, the IMF predicted Poland's high growth of 5-6 % annually with inflation 
going down to a single digit figure by 2000, it advised the government of a more 
flexible exchange rate policy and some structural changes in order to help lowering 
inflation82. 
 
 
Macroeconomic Trends in Turkey 
 The results of economic austerity in Turkey have been mixed.  As discussed above, 
the main reason behind this mixed picture has been the inability of the governments to 
carry out the reforms to their fullest extent.  This, in turn, was due to the weakness of the 
coalition governments.  With the nature of the recent national election results, it is doubtful 
that the newest coalition government will be able to implement meaningful reforms in 
privatization, civil service, social security, and government subsidies.  Table 8 presents data 
on macroeconomic indicators.
                                                 
81 FFO - Updater, August 1995, p.1. 
82 Hilfe Country Report: POLAND, OCTOBER 1996, Quest Economics, Janet Matthews Information Services, October 1, 
1996. 
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Table 8:  Macroeconomic Indicators for Turkey 
 
Indicator      1994  1995  1996 
 
Real GNP Growth @ 1987 prices (%)     - 6.1    8.1    7.1 
Consumer price inflation (%¸)         106.3  88.1  80.4  
Export fob ($ billion)        18.4  21.9  23.1 
Import fob ($ billion)       22.6  35.2  42.6 
Current Account ($ billion)         2.6  - 2.2  - 6.6 
Reserves excluding gold ($ billion-Dec)       7.2  12.4  16.5 
Total external debt ($ billion-Dec)     66.3  73.9  78.7 
Public sector borrowing req. (% of GNP)       8.1    6.9    9.5 
Budget balance (% of GNP)                - 3.7             - 4.1 
Exchange rate against $ US (end of year)      38,726  59,650         101,575 
 
Source:  EIU, Country Report, 1997 1st Quarter 
 
 
 The data in Table 8 indicate that the GNP recovered nicely from the serious decline 
in 1994.  The PSBR, on the other hand, shows a disturbing trend.  While it declined and 
foreign reserved increased by $5.3 billion in 1995, the borrowing requirement jumped to 9.5 
% of GDP in 1996 due to the WP’s irresponsible monetary policy (e.g., like the doubling of 
public sector salaries without dramatic increase in public revenues).  On the negative side, 
trade deficit widened, current account balance registered a deficit, the lira continued to fall 
against major currencies, and inflation remained at very high level.  Also, Turkey's foreign 
debt increased substantially to reach 78 billion dollars (see Table 9).  The financial aspects 
of austerity on the other hand, show a more promising results. 
 Despite a major reorientation of the Turkish economy, reforms are needed in 
numerous areas.  Failure to properly address these issues will most certainly affect the 
future relations of the economy with external capital.  One such area is the social security 
system.  The government plans to raise the retirement thresholds to reduce public 
expenditures because the current system does not specify a minimum age for receiving 
government pension.  Under the proposed new system, which required major bargaining 
between the two coalition parties, the required minimum age will be 55 for women and 60 
for men.  However, as Poortman pointed out, "the new arrangements will now cover all the 
present defects in the system because many workers are not registered and, thus, do not 
pay premiums."83  Moreover, the government faces political obstacles from some members 
                                                 
83Interview with Yesilada. 
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of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and trade unions.  With regard to the civil service 
workers, the current arrangement of an oversized civil service with low salaries is a sure 
formula for disaster.  The exact opposite is necessary to reform this sector.  However, no 
politician in Turkey is powerful enough to take on this task!  Welfare Party’s response has 
been to increase salaries without touching the oversized bureaucracy. 
 Privatization is another sore point in the government's efforts to achieve long-term 
structural reform.  Law 3291, passed in 1986, authorized the Public Participation 
Administration (PPA) to privatize the designated SEEs. The program began in 1987 at an 
experimental level but never reached a full scale effort.  The Özal government let it slide 
down to a lower priority in late 1980s as the Motherland Party lost public support.  The 
subsequent Demirel government did little to advance the topic either as powerful members 
of his coalition partner (RPP) objected to the idea.  Tansu Çiller, on the other hand, feels 
strongly about this topic but has to cope with the objections of members her same coalition 
partner.   Traditionally, the RPP has had strong ties to trade unions which are widely 
represented at the SEEs. 
 Feeling confident about her ability to achieve a break through in privatization, the 
previous Çiller government proposed to privatize the postal, telephone, and telegram (PTT), 
estimated at $10bn-$15bn.  This attempt came to a sudden halt when it was challenged in 
the Constitutional Court in 1993.  Following this failure, the government went back to the 
drawing board in 1994 and passed a law in November, after much parliamentary objections 
and bargaining, to speed up privatization.  Once again, the law was challenged at the 
Constitutional Court.  Finally in January 1995, the Constitutional Court upheld the law 
(EIU, 1995:  21).  Finally in January 1997, the Constitutional Court allowed the 
privatization of Turk Telekom, thus signaling the go ahead of privatization in Turkey.  The 
current government now targets privatization revenue at an initial figure of $5 billion by 
selling 20 SEEs, which employ 105,000 workers and accounting for 38 % of the SEE 
sales.84 
 Other important issues include fiscal reform, investment incentives, continued 
realignment of the Turkish lira, reform of the banking sector, and civil service reform.  
Success or failure will continue to depend on the internal dynamics of the Turkish political 
                                                 
84In February 1995, the state's 99.9 % holding of the Petlas tire factory was sold to Nadir 
Impex (owned by Muhtar Azeri) for $60 million; by mid-February, eight bids were made for 
30 % share of the Eregli iron and steel works out of the state's holding of 51.1 
%;privatization of HAVAS (the airport ground handling company) run into major problems 
when workers went on strike and the Prime Minister and her Transport Minister publicly 
accused each other of mishandling the sale, resulting in the resignation of the latter; the 
government also cancelled the sale of hte Meat and Fish Co. (Et ve Balik Kurumu) following 
mishandling of the bids; finally, there are talks in Ankara that the government is planning 
to draft a major privatization scheme for the PTT with the hope that this sale might bring in 
more than $10 billion. 
 33 
system and the relative pressures exerted on Turkish officials by foreign economic agents 
and institutions. 
 The decision to give the Central Bank more autonomy under the April 5 austerity 
package was very important because according to central bank law of November 1993, the 
government, through the treasury, was permitted to go to the bank for up to 15 % of 
budgetary outlays.  In 1994, this would mean a 50 % increase in broad money M2 which, in 
turn, would add to inflation sending it into hyperinflation range.  The new proposal of Çiller, 
reduced the treasury's demand to 7.5 %.  This was a welcomed move by the government 
given the fact that Çiller's lax monetary policy since July 1993 ,and her use of central bank 
funds to finance the budget deficit contributed to rise inflation by increasing the money 
supply and, moreover, caused the resignation of two central bank governors (in seven 
months)!  Unfortunately, the new coalition of Erbakan-Çiller has not paid attention to fiscal 
and monetary discipline.  Under their irresponsible policy decision, like the doubling of civil 
servant salaries, the Central Bank’s autonomy might became a mute point. 
 Finally, one other issue needs to be addressed.  This is the problem of a very large 
“Black Economy” or “Unregistered Economy” in Turkey which still presents a serious 
challenge to the Turkish government.  According to Osman Altug of Marmara University, the 
unregistered economy grew to 41% of GDP in 1994 from 34 % in 1992.  Unregistered 
workers now numbered at about 200,000.  The textile industry probably has unregistered 
exports of about $3.3 billion per year.  The Turkish bankers suspect that while the official 
figures show the economy shrinking by 6 % in 1994, following Çiller's austerity program, if 
one takes into account the black economy, the actual figure is more likely to be 2-3 %.85  
This factor explains the hidden resilience of Turkey's economy.  The black economy is also a 
source of perverse national pride in that it allows the Turks to be more wealthy than the 
official figures indicate.  However, the reality is that it helps the richer classes and hurts the 
underclass.  Tax evasion is extremely rampant resulting in higher budget deficits, increased 
interest rates, and higher inflation.  Under these condition, the IMF insisted on a new letter 
of intent for which the present government is by no means ready 
 
.Financial services  
 Banking in Turkey continues to undergo reforms since 1980.  Recently, efforts were 
underway to bring Turkey into line with European standards on capital accuracy and other 
prudential ratios in accordance with the customs union agreement.  There are 71 banks, 21 
of which are foreign owned.  State owner banks are the major source of finance but this is 
declining.  About fifty % of total bank assets are concentrated in four banks:  Ziraat Bankasi 
(Agriculture Bank), Emlak Bankasi (Housing Bank), Isbank, and Akbank.  The first two are 
                                                 
85Financial Times, "Bulkward Against Recession" ny John Barham in Survey of Turkey June 12, 
1995, p. 3. 
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state owned.  Most of the private banks in Turkey are linked to major industrial groups and 
represent a merger of industrial and financial interests of the Turkish business elites. 
Çukurova group controls Yapi Kredi bank, Pamukkale bank and Interbank.  The Sabanci 
Holding owns the most profitable private bank Akbank.  Koç holding includes the Koçbank.  
And Yasar holding owns 90 % of total shares in Tütünbank.  In addition to Turkish banks, 
there are Western commercial banks and some Middle Eastern finance houses.  In this 
environment, most Turkish firms generate funds internally from their banking subsidiaries 
rather than from equity floatations.86  Trading in government bonds and Treasury bills 
remain as dominant instruments of investors. 
 Five major institutions provide services as development banks.  These are the 
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (TSKB), the Turkish Development Bank, the 
Industrial Investment and Credit Bank (SYKB), the Iller Bank (Provinces Bank), and the 
Turkish Export Credit Bank.  The TSKB is the largest provider of long-term foreign exchange 
loans and local funding for industrial venture.  It distributes medium and long-term credits 
from the International Finance Corporation as well as other international agencies.  Credit 
from the TSKB is typically for 2-10 year period. 
 In contrast, private domestic investment bank are relatively new on the Turkish 
financial scene.  They are products of banking and other financial market reforms initiated 
by Özal.  Prior to 1980, they were, for most practical purposes, unheard of.  Their rise 
coincides first with liberalization of foreign exchange markets in the mid-1980s.  Since then, 
these banks have been feeding on capital markets.  There are five major private merchant 
banks in the country:  the EuroTürk Bank (subsidiary of Général Bank, Banque Indosuez, 
Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank, and Société Générale de Belgique), the Turk Merchant Bank 
(owned by Bankers Trust), the United Investment Bank (Kavala group and Jordanian 
interests), Tekfen Yatirim ve Finansman Bankasi (Tekfen Investment and Finance Bank), 
and the Yatirim Bank (Investment Bank  which is owned by the Trans-Arabian Investment 
Bank and other Saudi Arabian Interests).  It is widely believed that as the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (ISE) expands and Turkey's economic and business ventures in the region 
(including Central Asian republics) increase, other Western investment banks will enter the 
Turkish market.  As discussed above, this was an issue during the recent approval of a 
major credit package for Turkey by a consortium of Western banks.  However, before 
continuing with the ISE, where much activity has been witnessed, it is important to explain 
how and why Islamic banking entered the Turkish market at a time when all reforms 
pointed in the direction of western economic interests.   
 The last type of banking in Turkey is Islamic finance houses which practice Islamic 
banking.  At the end of 1994, there were five major Islamic banks and four Islamic finance 
houses operating in Turkey.  The banks are the Arab-Turk Bank, Bank Mellat (Iranian), 
                                                 
86EIU, Country Report:  Turkey, 1995-96, p.23. 
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Bank of Bahrain, Bank of Kuwait, and Habib Bank (Pakistan).  The main finance houses are 
the Al Baraka and Faisal Finance (both Saudi interests). 
 In Turkey, the entry if the Islamic capital into the economy coincided with the 
transition from military to civilian rule following the Motherland Party victory in the 1983 
national elections and continued until the 1991 national elections when the True Path Party 
of Süleyman Demirel won the national elections.  Turgut Özal's key role in accomplishing 
the necessary policy changes concerning foreign investment is obvious.  First, as soon as 
Özal became the Prime Minister in November 1983, he revised the regulations on private 
financial institutions through a series of governmental decrees.  Other related decisions 
soon followed. 
 First, Özal allowed the establishment of the Faisal Finance and Al Baraka Turkish 
Finance houses and provided them with special exemptions from Turkish bankruptcy laws.  
Interestingly, this happened shortly after the elections, on December 16, 1983, before the 
new government of Özal received a vote of confidence in the National Assembly.  Second, the 
government extended tax exemptions to the Islamic Development Bank in order to allow 
capital flows in accordance with the ISEDAK agreements.87 
 
Capital Flows and the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
 Following the signing of the new letter of intent and the Fund's approval in 1995, 
Turkey returned to international loan markets in April 1995, and secured a $500 million 
three-year loan package put together by U.S. and Japanese banks.  This was achieved after 
a year's absence from such efforts by Turkey. The agreement signaled Turkey's return to 
credit worthiness and paved the way for additional $2.0bn - $2.5bn in loans later in 
1995.88  The consortium of banks included the Citibank (which plans to expand its 
operations in Turkey), the Chemical Bank (which is looking at privately financed 
infrastructure projects in Turkey), investment banks such as Goldman Sachs and J. P. 
Morgan (which are hoping for privatization mandates), and Japanese banks (Bank of Tokyo, 
Nomura, and Yamaichi).  It is interesting to note that, the Turkish government sent 
international banks a letter in January 1995, warning that their future business operations 
with Turkey and/or in Turkey depended on their support for the government's effort to 
secure this loan. 
 The new loan consisted of $252 million floating rate notes that appealed to 
investment banks and $248 million in conventional syndicated loans.  The Çiller 
government intended to use the loan for covering budget deficit and financing of foreign 
                                                 
87This was a conference of Islamic countries where the participants decided to increae financial and 
other economic ties among the states.  Turkey wa a participant.  For extended analysis see Birol 
Yesilada, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East," in Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol 
Yesilada, eds., The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation, pp.  169-192. 
88 Financial Times, April 27, 1995, p. 3 
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debt payments (the government faced a $2.1 billion debt payments in July-August 1995).  
The cost of the deal was 3.5 % over London Interbank Loan Rate (LIBOR) which was rather 
expensive by today's standards.  However, it was cheap when one considers that it was 
proposed in late 1994 at the time when the Turkish government was rolling over its $12.5 
billion domestic debt every quarter at extremely high interest rates.  These developments 
provided positive signals for the investors in Turkish market.  Despite such difficulties like 
the downgrading of Turkey’s credit rating in 1994 and again in December 1996 - first half of 
January, 1997, Turkey has continued to actively borrow on the international capital 
markets, and it has not had major difficulties in keeping up its debt repayments.  In 
addition, Turkey’s reserves have steadily increased. 
 FDI in Turkey has been very little.  This is more obvious if one considers the size and 
growth of the Turkish economy.  For example, the net FDI in 1995 was only $772 million.  
The Gulf Crisis and its effects, many government crisis during the Ciller-led coalitions, the 
coming to power of the Islamist Welfare Party made the investors very uneasy and cautious.  
In that regard, most of the investment in Turkey since 1992, has been directed to maintain 
the existing projects instead of creating new projects.  While the portfolio inflows and 
outflows remained very insignificant up until the late 1980s, net portfolio investment 
increased steadily in the 1990s.  In 1993 it rose to $3.9 billion.  However, in 1995 it fell 
sharply to $1.72 billion. 
 The performance of the ISE, on the other hand, defies economic risk assessment.  
Despite continuing political problems (volatile coalitions, the Kurdish problem, and regional 
instability), and economic difficulties (e.g., high inflation, fiscal imbalances, etc.) the ISE 
continues to be one of the stars of the emerging markets.  Flow of capital into Turkey's 
buoyant stock market is also an indicator of the vitality of its private sector.  It should be 
noted that portfolio investments and outflows were insignificant in Turkey until the late 
1980s, when the government removed all foreign exchange controls.  The increase was 
remarkable.  The Istanbul Stock Exchange (see Figure 2), which suffered a major setback 
after the downgrading of Turkey's long-term debt in early 1995, showed remarkable 
recovery in the second quarter of 1995, following the signing of the Customs Union (CU) 
agreement between Turkey and the European Union. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
 Following the signing of the CU agreement, the index continued to grow until the 
government began to experience problems with the unions and challenges to its efforts to 
amend the constitution.  In Figure 2, (A) represents the time of the signing of the CU 
agreement, (B) the National Assembly's approval of constitutional amendments, (B)-(C) the 
period of political instability as the government faced organized labor's opposition and the 
collapse of the coalition, (C) the ratification of the CU by the European parliament, (D) 
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national elections of December 1995, (E) the CU goes into effect, (F) WP-TPP coalition, and 
(G) the privatization decision of the Constitutional Court. 
 The graph indicates that despite political instability, the market performed well since 
the signing of the CU agreement.  Furthermore, the trend seem to continue since the 
beginning of 1996.  Observations since that time show continued increase in the ISE 
composite index.  Much of this increase is due to domestic trading though international 
investors are gradually increasing the funds available for the ISE investments.  According to 
Landen Thomas, portfolio manager at Morgan Stanley's Turkey Fund, investors are 
attracted to Turkey for two reasons.  First is improvements on the political scene despite the 
shifts in coalition governments.  And the second is improvements in the interest rates.89  
Furthermore, returns on investments in Treasury bill show remarkable opportunity.  Such 
yields, which surged to 250.9 % in December 1995 due to political instability, dropped to a 
low of 120 % in early 1996.  As of mid-March, 1996, T-bill yields stood at 137 % which is far 
above the consumer price inflation of 69.6 %.  These are promising developments since the 
ISE composite index dropped 4.4 % in dollar terms in 1995, even though it  was up 46.8 % 
in lira terms.  Since the beginning of 1996, the ISE composite increased in dollar terms to 
reach an all time high of 791 (1986=100) in January 1997.  It is, however, unrealistic to 
expect this remarkable rise to continue as the government will face huge debt payments in 
early Summer and mid-Autumn. 
  An additional attraction of the Turkish market for foreign investors is this country's 
growing economic prominence in the region (Black Sea, the Middle East, and Central Asia).  
Potential of these new markets is known to international players who plan to increase their 
presence in Turkey (see above).  Expecting this increase in foreign capital, the Turkish 
capital markets board announced plans to establish two regional exchanges.90  The two 
locations considered are Denizli in the Aegean region and Gaziantep in the Southeastern 
region.  The goal is to integrate regional development projects with international financial 
capital.  The Aegean region is a highly diverse area in economic terms.  Gaziantep, on the 
other hand, represents a far lesser developed region but one where the gigantic Southeast 
Anatolian Project is located.  Following the completion of this project, an area larger than 
the size of Belgium will be converted to irrigated farming.  Finally, there are plans to develop 
an international stock market with the status of a free-trade zone.  Under this plan, trading 
will take place in dollars with no taxation of transactions. 
 In contrast to portfolio flows, FDI has been relatively small in Turkey not exceeding 
0.4 % of GNP per year since 1985.  One can find most Western brand names in the Turkish 
market but these are manufactured under license or partnership with Turkish businesses.  
Continued government regulations, red-tape, foreign exchange-rate instability, and regional 
                                                 
89Reuter, report on Turkey by Daren Butler, March 29, 1996. 
90EIU, Country Report:  Turkey, 1st Quarter, p.31. 
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uncertainties contribute to this trend.  The CU agreement, however, is expected to increase 
direct investment by EU companies since Turkey's until labor cost is considerably below the 
EU levels.  Perhaps with this agreement the government will be able to implement its build-
operate-transfer scheme more successfully.  Such investments are designed to attract 
investment in infrastructure without direct financing from the public sector.   
 
Foreign debt 
 As explained above, Turkey returned to return to the foreign loans market in 
February 1995.  According to the Treasury department, the country's foreign debt stock fell 
to $65.6 billion in September 1994 from a high of $67.3 billion in January of the same year 
(see Table 9).91  The country still faced a major challenge in this area as it paid $10-12 
billion in debt service in 1995.  However, there were no major concerns in Turkey's ability to 
meet its debt service requirement, particularly following the securing of the letter of intent 
agreement and the return to international loan markets.  According to figures obtained from 
the Treasury and the Central Bank, 80 % of the country's $74bn foreign debt in 1995 was 
long-term debt.  The debt service ratio was around 29.0-31.9 % with total external 
debt/GNP ratio standing at 35.1 %.  Under these circumstances, the immediate debt crisis 
was not expected.  However, these figures took a turn to the worse as the new Welfare-True 
Path government returned to the bond markets and private lending institutions (for short-
term credits) rather aggressively and increased the debt burden once again. 
  
[Table 9 here] 
 
Table 9:  Outstanding External Debt of Turkey (Million US$) 
 
      1991       1992       1993       1994       1995       1996 Q3 (*) 
BY MATURITY 
Total Outstanding External Debt (DOD) 50,489    55,592    67,356    65,601    73,278    78,042 
Medium - Long Term DOD   41,372    42,932    48,823    54,291    57,577    58,808 
(Public Sector)     39,120    39,748    42,855    48,147    49,958    49,762 
(Private Sector)     2,252      3,184      5,968      6,144      7,619      9,046 
Short Term       9,117     12,660    18,533    11,310    15,701    19,234  
 
 
 
                                                 
91 EIU, Country Report, p.  28. 
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BY LENDER 
MEDIUM - LONG TERM  41,372    42,932    48,823    54,291    57,577    58,808 
Multilateral Agencies   10,069      9,160       8,674      9,183      9,081      8,293 
IMF              0  0     0          344        573         663 
IBRD, IDA, IFC   6,540       5,761       5,440      5,380      5,191      4,695 
European Investment Bank      602          463          250         264           86           70 
European Resettlement Fund 2,859       2,889       2,952       3,065      3,114      2,739 
Islamic Development Bank        54            40            15          117         108         118 
OPEC Fund            5              3              2              0             0             0 
Int. Fund for Agr. Development        9            13             15            13            9             8                 
Bilateral Lenders   14,587     15,035     18,153      20,678    21,558    22,564    
OECD Countries   13,169     13,542     16,607     19,001     19,552    20,108 
OPEC Countries        438          363          317         236           247         216 
Other Countries        980        1,130       1,229      1,441       1,759       2,240 
Commercial Banks     4,309        3,640       3,083      2,325       2,346       2,016 
Bond Issues      6,683       9,316      12,623    13,788     14,186      15,118 
Private Lenders    5,724       5,781        6,290      8,317      10,406     10,817 
SHORT TERM       9,117     12,660     18,533     11,310     15,701     19,234 
Commercial Bank Credits     4,144       6,490       9,526       2,901       4,263       4,599 
Private Lender Credits     4,973       6,170       9,007       8,409      11,438     14,635 
 
(*) Provisional  
Source:  Turkish Treasury (1997) 
 
 
Political Outcomes 
 The above analysis show that since 1980, Turkey has experienced important 
liberalization of its economy.  There is no doubt that in today's economy Turkish citizens 
enjoy more freedoms than ever before.  However, has economic freedom spilled over into 
political freedoms–specially since transition to civilian rule took place in 1983? 
 In order to answer this question, it is crucial to briefly review how economic and 
political policies interacted during the last two decades.  During the 1970s, political 
instability and violence increased as economic conditions worsened in Turkey.92  The result 
was the coup of September 12, 1980.  Once in power, the coup coalition announced its 
adherence to the January austerity package and then severely restricted individual civil and 
                                                 
92For detailed discussion see Henri J. Barkey, The State and Industrialization Crisis in Turkey 
(Boulder:  Westview, 1990); C. H. Dodd, The Crisis of Turkish Democracy (North Humberside:  Eothen 
Press, 1983); Frank Tachau, Authority, Democracy, and Development (New York:  Praeger, 1984). 
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political rights by replacing the 1961 Constitution with an authoritarian document.  
Moreover, it closed down all political parties.  In an earlier study, Yesilada argued that the 
new Turkish political system resembled a heterogeneous form of interest representation 
which is a cross between state corporatist and pluralist forms of interest representation.93  
The 1982 Constitution placed state control over the activities of citizens, interest groups, 
and political parties much like the practices observed in other exclusionary state corporatist 
systems.  Yet, despite these restrictions, politics have moved in the direction of pluralism, 
though it has been a gradual progress, since transition to civilian rule in November 1983.  
Today, all of the pre-1980 political parties are re-established, all restrictions on party 
officials have been lifted, and above all, in June 1993, Turkey became one of the few 
Western democracies to have a women head of government. 
 Can one attribute this transition from the coup imposed authoritarian state 
corporatism to a more pluralistic system to Turkey's integration with global financial 
markets?  As explained earlier, there is no clear cut empirical evidence that such causality 
exits.  In the Turkish case, we see a mixed record.  Initially, foreign capital benefited from 
the authoritarian order of the 1980 coup.  Since the application to join the European Union, 
however, there are signs of external economic pressures to reform the political system. 
 During the 1980s, the resurfacing of the pre-1980 political forces can be attributed 
to the following political factors:  (1)  continuity of political leadership in the Turkish 
political parties;  (2)  general opposition to the military imposed political parties; (3) some 
pressure from the European Union, than the European Community, and the United States 
to return to multiparty democracy; and (4) internal tensions and contradictions of the 
political order established by the generals.94  Basically, it was primarily the domestic 
political pressures and not international capital that led to the unraveling of the 
authoritarian order.  In fact, during the initial economic reform period, the national and 
international capital enjoyed the presence of an authoritarian regime since this neutralized 
organized labor's and opposition parties from preventing the implementation of the 
economic program.95 
 However, when we consider the recent experiences of Turkey with external capital 
the above observations are no longer applicable.  This is particularly the case when we 
observe the interplay between Turkey's desire to be part of the European Union, the signing 
of the Customs Union (CU) agreement, and the reaction of the Istanbul Stock Exchange to 
this relationship.  That is, the relationship involves Turkish response(s) to EU pressures for 
reform, EU's response to Turkish action(s), and the investors reaction to the policy outcome.  
In the next section, I will provide a brief overview of this relationship. 
                                                 
93Birol Yesilada, "Problems of Political Development in the Third Turkish Republic, " Polity, Vol. 21, 
no. 2 (Winter, 1988), pp. 345-347. 
94Ibid., and also see  
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A Crucial External Factor:  The European Union 
 Turkey applied for membership in the EU in 1987.  Without going into the 
details of membership requirements and how Turkey fairs vis-à-vis these criteria, it 
is sufficient for the purposes of this paper that the two sides agreed to create a 
customs union to further integrate their markets.96 Yet, this was not to be an easy 
task.  When the EU and Turkish officials met to discuss the CU, Greece vetoed the 
idea at the EU Council of Ministers meeting on December 19, 1994.  The Greek 
government explained that it opposed the CU as long as Turkey did not improve its 
human rights record and ended its occupation of northern Cyprus.  The supporters 
of the CU argued that Turkey was in the process of reforming its authoritarian 
constitution and that the Turkish military presence in northern Cyprus was result of 
complex problem which, in part, was caused by the Greek Junta in 1974.  However, 
it quickly became clear that Greece was not about to drop its objection to the 
customs union until it obtained some concessions from the other EU countries.  The 
deadlock ended as a result of intense negotiations between the EU and Greece, 
under the leadership of the then French foreign minister Alain Juppe.  In exchange 
for lifting its veto, the Greek government received some economic and political 
concessions from the EU97 
 Yet, the agreement still required ratification by the European Parliament (EP) where 
Turkey opposition.  The socialist bloc and the Greens opposed the CU because of Turkey’s 
poor human rights record, especially in relations to the Kurdish problem, and the presence 
of authoritarian elements in the Turkish constitution. 
 The supporters of the CU, mostly the member countries with vested economic 
interests in Turkey, argued that since transition to a civilian rule in 1983, Turkey’s political 
system has been gradually becoming more democratic in the Western pluralist fashion.  The 
Kurdish problem, on the other hand, was more than a domestic concern for the Turks since 
the militant Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) operated out of Iraq and Syria.  Nevertheless, the 
Turkish government of Tansu Çiller moved to reform the constitution of the country in order 
to secure the ratification of the CU. 
 In July 1995, the National Assembly passed amendments to 15 articles of the 
constitution easing the restrictions on individual civil and political rights.  Among these, the 
important changes included: 
1. The right of trade unions to engage in political activity (Arts. 33 & 52). 
                                                                                                                                                        
95Yesilada and Fisunoglu, "Assessing the January," p. 207. 
96For detailed discussion of EU-Turkey relations see Atila Eralp, "Turkey and the European 
Community:  Prospects for a New Relationship,"  in Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, and Birol Yesilada, 
eds., pp. 193-214 and John Redmond,  (Aldershot:  Dartmouth, 1993). 
97Athens News Agency Bulletin, February 20, 1995, as cited in Wood and Yesilada, The Emerging European Union, p. 209. 
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2. The right of civil servants to join trade unions (Art. 53). 
3. The lowering of the voting age to 18 (Arts. 67 & 68). 
4. Permitting professional organizations to engage in politics (Art. 135), and 
5. Permitting university staff and students to engage in politics (Arts. 67 & 68). 
However, six other amendments were defeated which would have made it more difficult for 
the government to ban strikes, allowed strikes by civil servants, and withdrawn the present 
immunity from persecution of former members of the military government of 1980-83.98  
More alarming was that the government failed to amend Article 8 of the Law for the 
Suppression of Terrorism.  This article makes even a verbal support of Kurdish nationalism 
a crime against the state.  It was this law that the State used as basis for punishing the six 
ex-DEP (pro-Kurdish Democracy Party--closed down in 1994) members of the National 
Assembly.  These parliamentarians received long prison sentences. 
 Against this background, the Turks and their European allies intensified their 
diplomatic efforts, aided by the U.S., to secure the ratification of the CU agreement.  They 
argued that beside providing important economic benefits to European businesses, the CU 
held the promise of assisting Turkey with greater economic liberalization and structural 
reforms and eventually further democratization.  Furthermore, they argued that the CU 
would give a leverage to the coalition government of Çiller as it faced growing Islamic 
fundamentalist opposition form the Welfare (Refah) Party of Necmettin Erbakan.  This 
Islamic party opposed the CU and favored withdrawal of Turkey form NATO.  With the 
national elections scheduled for December 24, 1995, the pro-CU forces intensified their 
efforts and succeeded in obtaining the ratification of the agreement by the EP on December 
13, 1995.  Unfortunately, the CU victory did not translate into an electoral victory for Mrs. 
Çiller. Her party, the True Path, received 19.2 % of the votes, while her other center-rightist 
opponent, the Motherland Party, obtained 19.7 % support, and Refah took 21. 3 %.99  With 
these results the Turkish political scene entered a period of uncertainty.  Mrs. Çiller 
resigned as Prime Minister and negotiations began between the parties to formulate a new 
coalition government.  After three months of intense bargaining between the parties the 
Motherland and True Path formed an uneasy coalition government that only lasted three 
months.  Since then Çiller formed another coalition, this time with Refah, and agreed to 
Erbakan’s serving as Prime Minster for the first two years of the coalition government. 
 The CU which entered into effect on January 1, 1996, gives the Turkey closer 
economic relations with the EU than any other nonmember countries except Iceland and 
Norway.  It opens Turkey’s huge market of 65 million consumers to EU products and 
encourages investments in Turkey by third parties (e.g., American and Japanese companies 
                                                 
98 Economist Intelligence Unit (1995).  Country report, Turkey.  3rd Quarter, (London:  EIU), 
pp. 10-11. 
99 Financial Times (December 27, 1995), p. 2. 
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which can manufacture goods in Turkey for sales in the EU).  Moreover, the CU provides an 
access to Central Asian markets for the European companies because of Turkey’s growing 
economic and political influence in this region.  Turkey, in return, will receive large 
economic assistance form the EU and the Turkish companies would benefit form increased 
competition from their European counterparts.  It was this immense economic potential and 
the desire of the secular Turkish elite to convince the citizens that Turkey is part of Europe 
that resulted in the constitutional reforms of 1995.  It is highly doubtful that such reforms 
toward democratization would have occurred so quickly had the CU not been on the 
agenda. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS 
 Due to lack of more refined data (weekly observations of the WIG index in dollar 
terms) we were unable to carry out a meaningful empirical analysis of the two time series 
tables.  Our future research plan includes tabulation of such comparable data for both the 
ISE and WIG and to carry out an integrated time series analysis (ARIMA) to assess the 
impact of key policies and external and internal shocks on these markets.  It is important to 
note that the two indexes show a similar volatile fluctuations during their initial phases - 
1986-92 for ISE and 1992-94 for WIG.  However, the fluctuations seem to be tapering off 
during the later years.  Having said this, we can nonetheless make some general 
observations about economic reforms in Poland and Turkey. 
 Market reforms and political reforms proceeded very fast in Poland in the 1990s.  
Liberalization of the economy began as a result of economic and political crises created by 
the communist governments of the 1980s.  The communist governments continued to 
increase the country’s foreign debt and followed inflationary policies.  During the 1990s, the 
successive governments pushed ahead with comprehensive liberalization of the economy.  
As a result, the Polish economy was very rapidly transformed into a market oriented 
economy, abandoned its COMECON bonds and increasingly became linked to the West.  
The new linkage also provided a fresh supply of capital for the economy.  The success of the 
WSE is an example of this new ties. 
 On the domestic side, one observes the importance of the progressive policies of the 
first Solidarity-led governments which enjoyed a period of unchallenged public support.  
However, these governments paid heavily in future elections for not giving in to public 
demands.  Reforms were put into effect “too rapidly.”  In addition, President Walesa’s 
unclear political leadership during the early 1990s led to the ousting of the Balcerowicz 
team without providing for an immediate alternative.  Fortunately, leftist-oriented 
governments that followed did not change substantially the pro-market oriented economic 
policies.  The independent role of the National Bank of Poland in providing the stabilizing 
force cannot be underestimated at the time when governments preferred inflationary 
policies. 
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 Poland’s economic standing and rating on the international arena was helped by a 
substantial reduction of its foreign debt in 1994.  Subsequently, the influence of the IMF 
and the World Bank declined.  Currently, Polish laws and policies are more often than not 
geared toward the EU standards in anticipation of the country’s future membership in the 
Union.  It is widely expected that after the 1997 parliamentary election the government will 
be formed by some form of Solidarity-PSL coalition.  Although the pro-market policies are 
expected to continue, both parties are likely to be more cautious on two important issues of 
public concern:  privatization and the penetration of the national economy by foreign 
capital. 
 While one can argue that economic reform seem to have taken place during the 
period of political transformation in Poland, it is not clear to what extent one development 
led to the other.  That is, we observe both political and economic pressures coming from 
inside-out and outside-in simultaneously.  External pressures include the role of the IMF 
with economic transformation and the EU with both economic an political transformation.  
Internal pressures include the market opportunities created by the reforms, particularly in 
the financial services, and democratic awakening of the masses.  
 The Turkish case is also important for our purposes.  Market reforms and political 
reforms have proceeded at different paces in contemporary Turkey.  Liberalization of the 
economy began as a result of crisis created by the bottleneck problems of the import 
substitution growth model.  During the 1980s, the successive governments pushed ahead 
with liberalization of the foreign trade, investment, and foreign exchange regimes.  As a 
result, the Turkish economy was successfully transformed into a market oriented economy 
with important links to international capital.  The ISE grew rapidly and soon became one of 
the star markets of emerging markets.  During the 1990s, these developments continued 
and Turkey became a major site for international economic activity.  Several internal and 
external factors, which can be referred to as the inside-out and outside-in pressures, 
account for these developments. 
 On the domestic front one sees the importance of the governments which carried out 
these reform measures.  In addition, Turgut Özal, who had his own technocratic team, had 
a vision for Turkey's economic future.  Without the presence of Özal it would have taken 
much longer for the traditional political elite to undertake the necessary reform measures.  
Finally, international institutions (e.g., the IMF and the World Bank, the EU, and private 
banks and investors) pushed for the liberalization of the economy.  It was the combination 
of these factors that explain Turkish economic miracle.  The post-Özal governments failed to 
implement a comprehensive reform program or they failed to complete Özal’s unfinished 
program. 
 Yet, can we conclude that recent political reforms in Turkey and the previous return 
to pluralism in the late 1980s are attributable to economic liberalization.  Is there a link 
between the two?  The analysis of political developments in Turkey suggests that there is no 
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clear causal link between the two.  During the late 1980s, domestic political pressures 
resulted in transition to pluralism.  However, strict restrictions on individual civil and 
political rights remained in place just when foreign capital began pouring into the Turkish 
economy.  Within the last few years, different coalition governments promised to reform the 
Constitution but did not act on it.  It was not until an external factor, in this case the 
European Parliament, threatened to block the passage of a very important economic 
agreement that the Turks moved to amend the constitution.  Ironically, even with these 
reforms much is needed to bring Turkish democracy to the same level as Western 
democracies. 
 
 
 
 
